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project management office (PMO) in the portfolio company. The PMO manages a portfolio of 
projects focusing on prioritizing, resourcing, creating a project management system and, above 
all contributing to better strategy execution. 
This master thesis focuses on examining the circumstances under which the PE investors have 
established PMOs in their portfolio companies and how the PMOs in turn have contributed to 
value creation. Special interest is paid to the situational configurations of different PMO 
frameworks and roles in different stages of private equity investment lifecycle. This study builds 
on previous research on private equity investors’ value creation mechanisms (Järvenpää, 2014) 
and on strategic PMOs (Crawford, 2011).  
This thesis was conducted as a qualitative research and it was based on four case companies and 
six value creation programs run within these companies. The case companies were selected based 
on their fit to the defined scope so that they formed a representative set of different PMO 
configurations. All the case companies have received funding within the last ten years. In 
addition, they had recently run a PMO or were currently running one. In general, a C-level 
executive and an investment case manager per case were interviewed by a semi-structured theme 
interview. In addition, written PMO material from case companies was analysed.  
The data analysis provided a set of generalizable statements, structures and frameworks as well 
as direct quotes that were used in the findings. The method of analysis, systematic combining, 
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discussed to develop a framework for using PMO as a value creation mechanism. The framework 
encompasses propositions of underlying situational and organizational factors the PE investors 
should take into account when establishing a PMO to benefit from it. 
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hassuttelijalle, Ainolle, jonka maanläheinen asenne on pitänyt tämänkin haihattelijan jalat 
maassa.  
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Itäisessä Satamakaupungissa kuin Suomenlahden toissa puolen. Kiitos Athene ja 
Informaatioverkostot siitä, että olen saanut olla juuri niin vähän – ja paljon -  teekkari 
kuin olen halunnut. Tupsulakin painan silti Wappuna päähän ylpeänä!  
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valppauden.  
 
Helgingissä, 25.11.2017, 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Today, private equity investors operating within private equity house apply value creation 
mechanisms that often differ from traditional value creation methods such as financial 
engineering and cost cutting. Private equity investors focus now on operational 
development of their portfolio companies and creating strategic distinctiveness. In 
contrast to other forms of investments, such as venture capital, established private equity 
houses traditionally invest in already stabilized companies in low-growth but cash-rich 
industries (Jensen, 1989).  Recently PE investors have also explored industries with 
different industry and market dynamics. 
 
Private equity emerged as an alternative form of ownership already in the 1980s. As a 
result, the amount of literature discussing different value adding mechanism is 
comprehensive. Several studies have found positive relationship between buyout 
investment and firm performance (see e.g. Jensen, 1989; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; 
Valkama et al., 2013). Moreover, project management is a well-studied research field, 
and thus research on project management and project management offices (PMO) is 
extensive. Regarding the impact of project and program management offices on firm 
performance, several studies have shown that PMO contributes to improved project 
management and consequently to improved strategy execution (see e.g Crawford, 2011). 
Consequently, more and more companies turn to PMOs to secure execution of 
strategically meaningful projects and programs. Although both research streams are 
strong as such, their intersection has received little attention. This study builds on earlier 
research on both private equity industry and PMOs, and by combining interview data with 
other data sources constructs insights and best practices of the use of PMO in private 
equity investments. 
 
Even though several studies have clearly demonstrated the positive impact of private 
equity investors in their portfolio companies and explored a series of value adding 
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mechanisms, it is not fully understood how private equity investors can exploit these 
mechanisms at the very operational level in their portfolio companies. It is presented that 
PMO can act as transformational device, it ensures better use of resources within a 
program or in a multi-project environment and contributes to e.g. better monitoring, and 
improved efficiency. Private equity investors have also discovered the value of PMOs 
and systematically establish PMOs in their portfolio companies. However, it is still rather 
unclear under which circumstances and how private equity investors can and should use 
a PMO to create value.  
 
Besides building on prior studies on private equity investors’ value adding mechanisms 
and use of PMO, the aim of this study is to provide private equity investors and case 
teams improved and deeper understanding of the use of PMO in the context of private 
equity and especially buyout investments. The study aims to provide practitioners tools 
to evaluate when a PMO can contribute to value adding activities, as well as insights and 
best practices of the use of PMO.  
 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
Earlier studies have shown that private equity investors have succeeded in creating 
additional value in their portfolio companies which have often outperformed their peers 
(Acharya et al., 2013; Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). However, it is not fully 
understood how private equity investors exercise their power at the operational level in 
their portfolio companies through PMOs and thus contribute to value creating and adding 
activities. Hence, the aim of this study is to explore the circumstances where PMO can 
be used to create value and mechanisms through which PMO can contribute to value 
adding activities in buyout investments.  The research question is as follows:  
How and under what circumstances can private equity investors create value in their 
portfolio companies using a PMO? 
 
In order to answer the question, one must understand the underlying value adding 
mechanisms of private equity and how and under what circumstances these mechanisms 
are used. On one hand, it is crucial to understand why private equity involvement have 
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affected positively the firm performance, and on the other what has resulted in negative 
returns or can be considered a failure. In addition, one must understand the mechanisms 
and typical processes of a PMO: how and under what circumstances companies establish 
and use PMOs and consequently, how they operate within an organization. Earlier studies 
have discussed the use of a PMO in context of large, often publicly listed companies. 
Although these findings are related to firm-level performance and the value created by 
PMO, it is reasonable to examine PMOs specifically in the context of private equity 
portfolio companies and what is the additional value provided by the PMO since private 
equity investor ownership alters the operating environment and objectives e.g. in terms 
of leverage and dept. Special attention is paid to how PMOs can contribute to 
transforming companies and managing strategic initiatives.  In conclusion, the main 
question can be divided into two sub-questions:  
 
1. How do private equity investors seek to create value in their portfolio companies?  
2. How can a PMO contribute to value creation in context of a leveraged buyout 
company? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this study has three primary objectives:  
1) To review existing academic literature on value adding mechanisms of private 
equity investors and on use of and value created by the PMO  
2) By studying the sample of case companies, to explore how and under what 
circumstances private equity investors have used PMO to create value in their 
portfolio companies  
3) To generate a synthesis that explains when and how private equity investors 
should use a PMO to create value in the portfolio companies 
 
The purpose of the first objective is to provide relevant theoretical data that can be utilized 
in the analysis of case companies and on the other hand, in the theory building phase. The 
first objective is essential in constructing an initial theoretical framework and in achieving 
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the two latter ones. The second objective is crucial in elaborating a synthesis of PMOs’ 
contribution to value creation in private equity investment portfolio companies. 
 
1.3 Research design, methods and scope 
This thesis is conducted as a multiple case study. The research process consists of five 
distinct phases as illustrated in the Figure 1. First, initial theoretical framework is build 
based on existing academic literature. Findings from the first phase then guide the 
interview process and the study in general. 
 
Figure 1: Research process 
 
In the second phase, cases are selected based on relevant conceptual categories. That is, 
they are chosen so that the selection follows theoretical, rather than random sampling 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Previous academic literature has examined private equity investors’ 
value creation process in different phases of the investment. Also, the value adding 
mechanisms of project management offices are widely discussed in earlier academic 
studies. Thus, it is justified to choose cases from different industries and in different 
phases of private equity ownership in order to explore the factors affecting the value 
creation mechanisms of PMO in private equity portfolio companies. Furthermore, cases 
are selected so that they include both exceptionally well-structured project management 
offices as well as companies with less structured or no established PMO at all. By 
examining various types of PMOs, the study will reveal not only how successful PMOs 
create value but also how they differ from their peers and in which terms.  
 
The next phases, data collection and data analysis are conducted concurrently. By doing 
so, it is ensured that initial findings are also considered in data collection phase 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989). The last phase consists of developing a relevant and meaningful 
theoretical framework which summarizes the findings of previous phases. The Figure 1 
illustrated how analyzed data is simultaneously compared with the findings of the 
literature review. Thus, the research process is iterative.  
 
In view of the research problem, program management offices in companies that have 
received private equity funding are the most natural unit of analysis for this study. In 
addition, the time frame of potential cases was limited to companies that had received 
funding during 2007-2016 to ensure the topicality of the results. 
 
In the data collection phase, the main data sources include interviews with investment 
case representatives and managers of the case companies. This data is then supported by 
and combined with additional data sources consisting of analyses and reports from PMO 
initiation phase and PMO reports. These primary data sources are supported by secondary 
data sources such as information on prior work experience of PMO leads from LinkedIn 
and complementary event data from board reports.  
 
1.4 Definitions of key terms 
Private equity 
According to EVCA (2007), private equity is “the provision of equity capital by financial 
investors – over the medium or long term – to non-quoted companies with high growth 
potential”. Private equity falls under the umbrella of “alternative investments” together 
with stock and bond portfolios, and can be considered as the main category for all equity 
capital investments in non-stock listed companies.  
  
Buyout  
A buyout is a private equity investment in which the PE investors purchases company 
shares thus acquiring controlling interest of the targeted firm. Investment is often 
completed together with the existing management team. A management buyout (MBO) 
is completed by the management team of the company in question. A leveraged buyout 
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(LBO) is accomplished when debt accounts for a substantial share of the total investment. 
In an LBO, the returns generated are expected to be greater than the interest paid on the 
debt and thus, investors risk only a small amount of capital while realizing high returns 
(EVCA, 2007).  
 
PE investor and PE company 
The focus of this thesis is in the value-adding activities of private equity investors in their 
portfolio companies. Focus is two-fold: on one hand, the purpose is to outline private 
equity companies and investors’ value creation mechanisms and, on the other, explore 
and understand the role of PMOs in firm-level value creation. Hence it is important to 
distinguish PE investor and PE company from portfolio company. PE company refers to 
companies that manage private equity funds whereas PE investors are investment 
professionals who work in PE companies. In other words, PE investors operate within a 
PE company. PE investors are also referred as investment partners, investment managers 
or investment professionals. PE companies are established parties in comparison to 
individual investment professionals or a group of investment professionals. This thesis 
focuses strictly on PE companies and PE investors as defined above. ( 
 
Portfolio company 
This thesis focuses on value-adding activities accomplished in a PE investment portfolio 
company, also called a target company or case company. Portfolio company has received 
funding or is currently funded by a private equity company. The PE investor and the PE 
company exercise their power gained through majority ownership over the portfolio 
company.  
 
Project or Program Management Office (PMO)  
Project or program management offices (PMO) vary widely: “Some serve as a means to 
standardize project-related governance processes and facilitate sharing of resources and 
tools” (Project Management Institute, 2017) and others act as a strategy implementation 
vehicle. PMO is home of project management system and center for developing project 
  7 
management expertise. It manages a distinct program and project portfolio and has 
operational as well as financial responsibility over projects. A PMO may at simplest be 
center of excellence, but it can also hold a strategically important role in the organization. 
In this study, most PMOs carry a strategically meaningful role in ensuring strategy 
execution through variety of projects or enabling strategic change in the target company. 
A strategic PMO aligns project and program work with corporate strategy across an 
enterprise and thus, often acts as a transformational device (Crawford, 2011). 
 
Even though project management office is by far the most used term, it is recommended 
to name PMO as program management office or enterprise project management office to 
accentuate its enterprise-wide, strategic role. Adequate name emphasizes the corporate 
objectives PMO pursues. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This study is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I summarize the key findings of earlier 
research and academic literature both on the value creation mechanisms of private equity 
and on the use of PMO. Chapter 3 presents research methodology in more detail and main 
data sources. In Chapter 4, I present results of the study whereas in Chapter 5 I discuss 
the implications of the results. Last, Chapter 5 also assesses the validity and reliability of 
this study and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Private equity value creation mechanisms 
There are number of mechanisms that can either increase or decrease company value. 
Value generation can be intrinsic or extrinsic. Industry or market-level changes derive 
extrinsic value creation and thus it is not directly linked to company performance. 
Intrinsic value creation stems from firm-level improvements e.g. in operational 
efficiency, new strategic direction or better margin management (Berg and Gottschalg, 
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2004). Traditionally, value is created in buyouts through high leverage and powerful 
incentives which drive buyout companies to improve operational performance and force 
them to distribute cash in the form of high debt payments (Jensen, 1989; Valkama et al., 
2013)). However, White and Zeisberger (2016) critique that it is hard to quantify the 
impact of individual drivers on enterprise value creation and consequently, on investment 
returns. 
 
There are three phases in a buyout: acquisition, holding period and divestment as depicted 
in Figure  2 (EVCA, 2007; Bain & Company, 2017). Most of economic value generation 
is completed at the two last phases, that is, during the holding period and at exit. Value 
creation during holding period is strongly linked to financial performance: improvements 
in operational performance, reduced cost of capital and for instance better cash flow 
management contribute to financial performance in terms of increased revenues and 
margins, and therefore, to value creation. Economic value is captured at exit. However, 
value captured is not necessarily linked only to performance improvements but to 
valuation multiple: rising market or industry valuation also generates larger returns (see 
e.g. Berg and Gottschalg, 2004; Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011).  
 
Figure 2: Portfolio company lifecycle 
 
Even though in majority of cases private equity ownership has a positive effect on 
company performance, it is important to bear in mind that not all buyouts are successes 
(see e.g. Hobbs, Aubry and Thuillier, 2008; Aubry and Hobbs, 2011; Forrester 
Consulting, 2013). Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz (2001)  argue that asymmetry of 
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information between managers, owners and investors can cause buyout investments to 
fail or not to reach their full potential of returns. Leveraged buyouts are proven to generate 
larger gains for shareholders, but Jensen (1989) argues that value gains do not accrue at 
the expense of other financial constituencies. Leveraged buyouts increase efficiency 
without massive lay-offs or substantial cuts in research and development investments. 
However, some researchers argue that the cost of leverage outweighs the benefits (Jensen, 
1989).  
 
Bruining, Verwaal and Wright (2013) differentiate between two distinct private equity 
models: a traditional financial investor and an active investor. The traditional financial 
investor seeks to create value through financial engineering and improved governance 
with strong financial incentives. They can increase company value through EBITDA 
impact, multiple impact and net debt impact. Private equity investors can also reintroduce 
mechanisms for inorganic growth in terms of mergers and acquisitions (Achleitner, Figge 
and Lutz, 2014). Operational efficiency is increased through combining different business 
units through adding-on acquisitions. Thus, the initial buyout firm acts as a platform 
(Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). They also limit cross-subsidization among 
business units and waste of free cash flow (Jensen, 1989). These buyouts often call for 
new governance mechanisms (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). PE investors can 
also promote organic growth by increasing market share (see e.g. Achleitner, Figge and 
Lutz, 2014).  Also, increases in leverage produce larger tax shields hence boosting returns 
by increasing cash flows (Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011).  
 
PE companies use various tools of active ownership adaptively to increase the value of 
their investments.  Active investors take a more operational and attentive role in managing 
and steering their portfolio of companies. However, researchers (see e.g. Bruining, 
Verwaal and Wright, 2013) also note that there are both positive and negative effects 
related to active ownership. Active ownership implies positive changes for example in 
the way the company is managed and in its strategic growth orientation as well as in 
organizational culture (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001; Järvenpää, 2014). In 
addition, active PE investors are professional risk-takers: they balance between risk-
seeking behavior and risk-mitigating measures (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004; Järvenpää, 
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2014). Value creation mechanisms of active investors are discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter and summarized in Table 1.  
 
It is also important to distinct between different kinds of buyouts and that both managers 
and investors are pursuing the same kind of buyout. For example, a collision and further 
failure is likely to happen if management seeks to undertake an efficiency buyout, but the 
PE investor has the mindset to pursue entrepreneurial buyout (Wright, Hoskisson and 
Busenitz, 2001). Moreover, Berg and Grottchalg (2004) have identified important factors 
affecting value creation comprising for example the relevance of specific characteristics 
of private equity investors such as technology industry and market expertise. On the other 
hand, differences in PE companies in term of backgrounds, capabilities and statuses also 
affect the additional value created by their portfolio companies (Järvenpää, 2014).  
Table 1: PE investor value creation mechanisms 
 
 
2.1.1 Leverage and reduced agency cost 
Jensen (1989) argues that PE houses rely heavily on leverage and buyout companies often 
have highly leveraged financial structures. Debt intensifies ownership incentives and 
managers have well-defined obligations to their creditors and claimants. Levers also force 
managers to pay debt payments rather than spend excess cash inefficiently. Jensen also 
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argues that companies should distribute excess cash to shareholders to maximize value 
and to continue operating efficiently, but managers of public corporations are often 
reluctant to do so. Leverage also forces executives to avoid wasteful investment projects 
and reduce over-diversification (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). However, Berg 
and Grottchalg (2004) note that in leveraged buyouts “debt per se creates no value, but 
value comes from operational efficiencies debt inspires.” 
 
PE houses create value by reducing agency costs. According to Jensen (1989), one of the 
most important contributions of private equity houses have been the resolution of conflict 
between managers and owners over the control and use of corporate resources. PE-held 
companies eliminate the conflict between interests of managers and owners without 
eliminating vital functions of risk diversification and liquidity due to high leverage 
(Jensen 1989). PE houses often make managers co-owners hence improving incentive 
alignment and by consequence, managers are more committed to the strategy. Thus, 
concentrated ownership drives agency costs down.  
 
PE houses also pose strong incentives to monitor managers’ actions (Berg and Gottschalg, 
2004). Incentives are tied to cash flow and performance, and PE houses monitor company 
headquarters directly hence eliminating bureaucratic oversight. PE houses use tools such 
as pay-for-performance compensation system and substantial equity ownership of 
managers and directors to incentivize them (Jensen, 1989). Stricter monitoring and 
efficient incentives also affect organizational performance and efficiency (Wright, 
Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). To summarize, disciplining effects of leverage and 
aligned interests of managers and owners contribute to value generation and offer larger 
returns to invested debt and equity capital (Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Management system and governance 
Successful PE investors can identify which type of management practices the portfolio 
company lacks and consequently create a balance between growth promoting and 
institutionalizing activities (Järvenpää, 2014). Some portfolio companies lack sufficient 
entrepreneurial mindset to promote growth, whereas others lack governance structure. PE 
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investors drive institutionalizing through rigorous reporting and monitoring as well as 
structured key performance indicators. Institutionalizing activities of PE investors 
systematize performance monitoring and set challenging performance targets. Thus, PE 
investors can increase company value by simultaneously promoting both entrepreneurial 
and administrative management. In other words, PE houses can help companies to 
develop ambidextrous organizational change (Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). 
 
Removing managerial inefficiencies also contributes to value generation in portfolio 
companies (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004). Fewer management layers and more 
decentralized management often translates to more agile and adaptive organization 
(Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). By consequence, leveraged buyout companies 
systematically opt for a less bureaucratic management structure with decreased corporate 
overhead.  
 
Fast strategic decision making promotes growth. It is linked to subsequent growth and 
profit, and mediates the relation of dynamism, centralization and formalization (Baum 
and Wally, 2003; Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). Baum and Wally show a positive 
association between fast strategic decision making and company performance, which 
creates competitive advantage. The writers debate also that a combination of centralized 
strategic processes and decentralized operations produces the best results. They argue that 
centralized authority outweighs the importance of additional information decentralized 
organization could provide. Aligning interests of both board and executive management 
team not only reduces agency costs but also enables fast decisions. By consequence 
private equity investment portfolio companies must balance between decentralized 
organization to remain agile and centralized authority to ensure fast strategic decision 
making.  
 
2.1.3 Operational improvements 
Private equity investors systematically seek to streamline their portfolio companies. 
Research has demonstrated that improved operational efficiency creates value (see e.g. 
Guo, Hotchkiss and Song, 2011; Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). For instance, 
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Acharya et al. (2014) state that “top, mature high performing PE houses create economic 
value through operational improvements” and thus can be considered a vehicle to carry 
out also organizational improvements.  By consequence, a buyout generally results in 
improved operating performance. Improved operational efficiency can be achieved 
through i) increased sales and ii) decreased cost of goods sold (Wright, Hoskisson and 
Busenitz, 2001). PE investors can make operational improvements by driving cash flow 
increases through sales increases and margin expansion (Achleitner, Figge and Lutz, 
2014). On the other hand, for instance centralized procurement improves cost of goods 
sold. 
 
Operational efficiency increases can be driven by streamlined organizational processes, 
reduced workforce costs and decreased unit costs (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 
2001). In addition, operational efficiency improvements also include cost cutting 
activities (Achleitner, Figge and Lutz, 2014). Streamlined capital expenditures and better 
working capital management affect operational efficiency, too. Reduced capital 
requirements in turn increase capital productivity and invite companies to rationalize 
corporate operations, and consolidate and reorganize operations (Berg and Gottschalg, 
2004).  Operational improvements can be achieved through governance engineering by 
improved and active monitoring and reporting procedures (Achleitner, Figge and Lutz, 
2014; Järvenpää, 2014).  
 
However, today gains achieved by driving operational performance improvements are 
significantly smaller than they were in the 1980s and variation is considerable. Yet gains 
from increased operational efficiency tend to be greater in cases where the CEO has been 
replaced and where active governance is in place, management selection careful and 
financial sponsors or bank lenders monitor the company actively (Guo, Hotchkiss and 
Song, 2011). Therefore, PE investors seek value creation also through other mechanisms. 
 
2.1.4 Strategic growth orientation 
Market leadership no longer guarantees financial success and thus creates a risk for 
companies that cannot keep up, but opportunities to those who can (Keenan et al., 2013). 
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With ever decreasing possibilities for value creation through financial engineering and 
improved operational efficiency, private equity investors apply a series of other levers 
that create value and contribute to returns (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004). In contrast to 
exceling in operational efficiency, strategic positioning involves performing similar 
activities differently or significantly different activities to meet same customer needs 
(Crawford, 2011). Bruining, Verwaal and Wright (2013) argue that “to successfully meet 
future customer needs requires cognitive refocusing of CEOs and entrepreneurial changes 
in strategic, growth and resource orientation”. Weak competitive position is tackled by 
revitalization that is by upgrades or incremental innovation but it does not guarantee long-
term survival nor success. In other words, revitalization is considered a form of moderate 
innovation through renewing competitive capabilities. In PE investment context, 
revitalization activities emphasize long-term incentives and hence only a moderate level 
of leverage is recommended (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). 
 
According to Bruining, Verwaal and Wright (2013), “PE houses can also act as a 
cognitive refocusing device for buyout firms, giving a new strategic direction.” PE houses 
often seek to increase strategic distinctiveness in their portfolio companies (Berg and 
Gottschalg, 2004). They participate in strategic planning and act as a sounding board to 
management team (Järvenpää, 2014). PE investors’ contribution in strategic planning is 
crucial as 60% of companies struggle with formulating a strategy and more importantly 
with implementing it (Keenan et al., 2013). PE investors help their portfolio companies 
in redefining strategic variables and promoting corporate refocusing (Berg and 
Gottschalg, 2004). Newly recruited CEO is often tasked with leading the strategic change 
and PE investor is then responsible for sparring and mentoring the CEO (Järvenpää, 
2014). In general, the purpose of using a buyout as an organizational refocusing device is 
to execute a shift in strategic growth orientation (Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 2013). 
Hence PE companies use buyouts as a tool to carry out strategic repositioning. 
 
Value creation can also be realized through adding a completely unique perspective 
(White and Zeisberger, 2016). PE investors can make radical changes in the strategic 
direction of their portfolio companies through international expansion, mergers and 
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acquisitions or adapting a new strategic direction through positioning, growth type and 
pace (Järvenpää, 2014).  
 
2.1.5 Improved strategy execution 
In addition to contributing to strategic planning and seeking value creation through 
strategic distinctiveness, PE investors equip their portfolio companies with strategy 
execution tools considering that strategic planning becomes meaningless in the absence 
of a way to execute planned strategy. Crawford (2011) argues that 70% of implementation 
of strategic initiatives fail since they require adopting and implementing new practices 
that would lead to world-class performance. However, there are no dominant approach of 
deploying a strategy, but corporate programs and strategic initiatives are vastly 
considered as vehicles to execute organization’s strategy (Crawford, 2011). 
 
Corporate programs are vehicles for strategic renewal and can be designed in various 
ways. Boppel et al. (2013) identify three distinct models for corporate programs: goal 
splitting, overlay and task force. While goal splitting is best for optimizing activities by 
specifying goals and assigning key initiatives to business unit managers or country 
managers; task force and overlay have a more strategic approach. Task force is often a 
synonym for project or program management office: it is designed to drive a small 
number of strategically meaningful topics. It often has focused funding and is monitored 
by the CEO. Overlay design adds to task force design and is best for situations of radical 
change and in turnaround situations.  
 
Managing change requires both hard and soft skills: soft skills consisting of 
communication, achieving organizational buy-in and aligning implementation whereas 
hard skills refer to traditional task force approach of creating program infrastructure, 
identifying and understanding business drivers as well as defining deployment actions 
(Saunders, Mann and Smith, 2008). Companies fail especially in communicating their 
strategy to employees and thus they lack buy-in in the new strategy and therefore in 
strategic initiatives. Furthermore, executives lack knowledge of their own business and 
hence initiatives are more likely to fail. Third, executives often use only financial 
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measures forgetting non-financial measures that can be even more essential in measuring 
success of strategy execution (Crawford, 2011; Keenan et al., 2013).  Boppel et al. (2013) 
summarize “corporate programs need buy-in from the line organization and should be 
integrated to ongoing operations” in order to succeed in contributing to strategy 
execution.  
 
PE houses also contribute in professionalization activities in their portfolio companies: 
more professionalized strategic planning becomes conceptualized and focused. During 
the strategic planning investors participate in the development of medium-term value 
creation plan (Järvenpää, 2014). More professionalized strategic planning also means that 
board and CEO need to decline growth ideas of top management. However, focused 
strategic planning contributes to value creation, not only in terms of creating strategic 
distinctiveness, but also in terms of improved resource allocation and project 
prioritization (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004). 
 
2.1.6 Promoting entrepreneurship  
In addition to increasing administrative management practices for instance in terms of 
better governance, monitoring and strategic planning, PE ownership often results in 
increases in entrepreneurial management practices, too (Bruining, Verwaal and Wright, 
2013). Companies can pursue both management practices in parallel, hence they are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
Buyouts can be a tool for entrepreneurial growth and upside growth. In contrast to simply 
refining strategic growth orientation, promoting entrepreneurship is a vehicle for renewal 
which leads to strategic innovation (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). Private 
equity investors can pursue substantial organizational turnaround by promoting 
innovation: Strategic innovation is a radical form of revitalization and consists of newly 
conceptualizing the business (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001; Järvenpää, 2014). 
Radical revitalization of buyout companies offers PE houses opportunities for significant 
value creation.  
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In addition to pursuing strategic innovation, private equity houses can also help buyout 
firms to develop and implement new entrepreneurial view on their business (Bruining, 
Verwaal and Wright, 2013). Researchers have observed that some companies show an 
increase in entrepreneurial ventures, in technology alliances and in R&D spend under PE 
ownership.  According to Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz (2001), buyouts are a common 
vehicle for entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurial mindset and strategic innovation are 
strongly interlinked.  
 
However, private equity investors should pay close attention to case company’s strengths 
and weaknesses in terms of managerial capabilities before facilitating entrepreneurial 
growth. Entrepreneurial mindset of only one executive can already create entrepreneurial 
dynamics. Entrepreneurial dynamics affects strategic decision-making and whereas 
accountability, compensation schemes, structure coordination and justification of future 
developments can inhibit innovation (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001; Järvenpää, 
2014).  Entrepreneurial mindset and strategic innovation is best in situations where there 
have been misalignments of incentives and managerial frustrations prior to the buyout. 
These corporate inefficiencies are opportunities for buyouts for entrepreneurial growth 
(Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz, 2001). 
 
2.2 Project and program management offices 
Project and program management offices come in all shapes and sizes considering that 
they must exercise both customization and sustained effort (Desouza and Evaristo, 2006). 
PMOs are commonly tailored to fit different organizational needs and to achieve different 
goals in various situations. 
 
2.1.1 PMO mission, objectives and characteristics  
Project management office’s mission is a triangle of enabling strategic alignment, 
organizational excellence and operational excellence. According to Forrester Consulting 
(2013), PMO’s mission is to “move the strategic needle for the company”. In order to do 
so, it must contribute in four strategic value drivers:  
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i) PMO must have a clear strategic vision which enables it to pursue right 
strategic initiatives at the right time    
ii) It must drive business success through consistent delivery practices: well-
designed, broadly understood, highly usable and adaptable approaches 
iii) PMO enables organizational change needed for growth by embracing 
education and evangelism 
iv) And last, it must play an active role in brand ownership 
 
Figure 3: PMO mission and objectives 
 
In addition, most PMOs have certain characteristics in common. First, they ensure that 
projects undertaken are aligned with and support the strategic goals. They are responsible 
for contributing to the success of project management in the organization. Third, they are 
often separate, independent units within the organization composed of e.g. experienced 
business and technology professionals. And last, they are responsible for developing 
standards and methodologies for project management in the organization (see e.g. 
Desouza and Evaristo 2006; Crawford 2011). PMO characteristics, tools and 
methodology are summarized in Figure 3 and discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
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Strategically meaningful PMO has two primary missions: first, to improve organization’s 
project management maturity and second, to link organization’s projects to its strategic 
plans (Crawford, 2011). According to Thorn (2003), “anything less is costly 
misapplication of scarce resources”. Thus, senior management needs to communicate 
strategic drivers to the PMO. There must be a fit between these drivers and the project 
management system to maximize the value from projects (Cooke-Davies, Crawford and 
Lechler, 2009). Project management maturity is enhanced and built based on project 
management system. It reflects senior management’s perspective on the strategic role of 
project management (Cooke-Davies, Crawford and Lechler, 2009) and hence its strategic 
importance.  
 
2.1.2 Advantages of a PMO 
There are several reasons for establishing a project management office. Companies form 
project portfolios and establish PMOs to manage their portfolio because projects are 
becoming shorter, more market-driven and the deliverables are more and more intangible 
(Crawford, 2011). Hence the management of such projects is becoming more and more 
complex. Forrester Consulting (2013) has identified three distinct catalysts that often 
result in implementing a PMO: i) a fatal failure of a very visible project ii) a project goes 
severely over budget or iii) the market competition forces stronger disciplines. 
Conversely, if a PMO enables success of a strategic project, can that too be a stimulus for 
implementing an organization-wide PMO. 
 
Organizations may also seek to gain control over their project efforts where PMO acts as 
a fundamental unifier of project activities. In addition, PMOs are a tool to establish and 
maintain a set of project management practices. The objective is to formalize project 
management oversight and improve project success (Letavec, 2006; Crawford, 2011). 
PMOs are commonly established to promote project culture, too. Ergo, PMO becomes a 
visible “face” for project and program management and thus promotes organizational 
awareness (Letavec, 2006). 
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There are substantial benefits in implementing a PMO. Studies have demonstrated a 
positive effect of portfolio management quality on portfolio success. Structured project 
management ultimately affects bottom-line (Dai and Wells, 2004; Ibbs, Reginato and 
Kwak, 2004; Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012) and thus generates greater yields. 
Organizations with a high performing PMO demonstrate above average financial 
performance (Project Management Institute, 2013a) while Unger, Gemünden and Aubry 
(2012) argue that PMO’s role is instrumental in attaining value from an organization’s 
investment.  However, researchers (Hobbs, Aubry and Thuillier, 2008; Aubry and Hobbs, 
2011) debate that a clear demonstration of the direct influence of project and program 
management on return on investment is not easily accomplished. Project Management 
Institute (2013a), too, acknowledges PMOs’ difficulty in demonstrating their value 
despite various studies.  Forrester Consulting’s (2013) study indicates that in terms of 
building project culture and establishing project management system, PMO is likely to 
realize its value in two years.  
 
A high performing PMO enables executives and managers to implement strategies: it 
empowers executives with greater agility and enables them to achieve better business 
outcomes. PMOs play a key role in achieving differentiation in the market and sustaining 
business growth. At project level, PMO ensures strategic project selection and contributes 
to successful delivery, reduced operational costs and increased employee satisfaction 
(Forrester Consulting, 2013). Crawford (2011) summarizes “without a project focus at 
the highest level of the business, projects seem to pop up at will across the organization 
generating confusion.” How PMO is structured and, in turn, how growing organizations 
invest in and develop them enables organizations drive more positive results from a PMO 
(Project Management Institute, 2013a).  
 
To fully exploit program management office, organizations need to create organizational 
awareness of the benefits of the PMO. Low performing organizations accept project 
management offices as an organizational unit but projects still are executed inconsistently 
(Project Management Institute, 2013a). Thus, organizations don’t make the most of their 
PMOs and return on investment is significantly lower. It is crucial to articulate what is 
expected from the PMO and how the PMO should improve project and program results 
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in order to realize its full value (Letavec, 2006). Most importantly, PMOs must be 
strategically aligned with executive management (Forrester Consulting, 2013). Desouza 
and Evaristo (2006) summarize the benefits and value from PMO:  it is “seen to combine 
the deliverable and focused discipline of project management with the conceptual and 
analytical strengths of business consultancy.”  
 
2.1.3 Establishing and developing PMO 
Researchers have identified steps that an organization should take when establishing a 
PMO. Building a PMO framework begins with an organizational culture of project 
management. It requires a proper credence, that is, management authority as well as 
support and tools. It should have both a clear direction and governance. Second, building 
a PMO framework requires continuous evaluation by the PMO.  
 
Building a PMO framework is a continuous process of evolving and improving through 
knowledge management and change management. Learning and improving is a key 
aspect in creating a high performing PMO. To facilitate learning and improving, a 
continual feedback loop between C-level executives and PMO should be built. As “all 
strategic change in organizations happens through projects and programs” (Project 
Management Institute, 2013a), practices must be in place to transfer insights and 
experiences from projects into organizational knowledge. Therefore, PMOs role is crucial 
in building intangible knowledge repository in organizations. 
 
Project management office should implement precise project metrics and introduce 
project owner evaluations in the establishing phase. PMOs assess project quality 
essentially through KPIs but also by seeking and collecting feedback from stakeholders 
and customers and (Project Management Institute, 2013a). Moreover, Unger, Gemünden 
and Aubry (2012) argue that program management office should be measured, too. Even 
though measuring project performance is one of PMOs key responsibilities, measuring 
PMO value is difficult and more complicated than measuring project performance. 
According to Aubry and Hobbs (2011) there are three distinct ways to look at the PMO 
performance: project management success, project success and corporate success where 
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corporate success consists of processes and decisions that translate strategy into programs 
and projects. On the other hand, Forrester Consulting (2013) has identified a series of 
metrics that help in measuring PMO value. PMO metrics according to Aubry and Hobbs 
and Forrester Consulting are summarized on Table 2 below.  
Table 2: PMO metrics 
 
2.1.4 PMO’s organizational position and role 
PMOs take many different roles, may have different forms and contribute to organizations 
in many ways (Hobbs, Aubry and Thuillier, 2008; Thamhain, 2004; Winch, 2004). This 
contribution is separate from the contribution to projects.  
 
Considering PMO’s strategic importance, they are often centrally placed in the 
organization (Project Management Institute, 2013a). Project or program management 
office is generally a small unit outside of other, major organizational units. Their 
independence from other organizational units enables them to be agile and to quickly 
respond to altering situations. Their ability to adapt and embrace only necessary 
disciplines is equally important in promoting project success (Aubry and Hobbs, 2011; 
Forrester Consulting, 2013). Due to their central organizational location, PMOs can sense 
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tensions and conflicts in the organization (Project Management Institute, 2013a) but 
because of their independency, can also contribute to conflict resolution.  
 
Aside from its central organizational home, PMO can play different roles. PMOs role in 
project management and developing project management system is crucial, but they also 
need to seek ways to incorporate process development and improvement in program 
management (Winch, 2004; Project Management Institute, 2013b). Project or program 
management office has primarily three roles: coordinating, controlling and supporting – 
all of which affect performance equally (Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012).  Following 
Unger, Gemünden and Aubry’s (2012) role categorization, results of other studies 
regarding PMO roles (Crawford, 2011; Keenan et al., 2013) are summarized in the Table 
3 below.  
Table 3: PMO roles and responsibilities 
 
Based on Unger, Gemünden and Aubry’s (2012) study controlling and coordinating roles 
impact the project portfolio management quality and thus predict portfolio success. 
Coordinating and controlling roles emphasize PMO’s role as a repository of expertise and 
guidance for individual project support whereas supporting role is essential in achieving 
overall organizational benefit (Thorn, 2003; Thamhain, 2004). 
 
In addition to defining the role of PMO, one should clearly differentiate the roles of 
project managers and PMO. When project managers focus on day-to-day activities of 
managing projects, PMO’s should focus on the business aspects of projects and how they 
contribute to overall business objectives (Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012). It is also PMO’s 
responsibility to ensure steady flow of strategic initiatives and projects to achieve 
strategic objectives (Saunders, Mann and Smith, 2008). The above-mentioned 
responsibilities highlight the importance of PMO in meeting the business objectives. To 
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summarize, PMOs role is often considered a consulting organization within an 
organization (Letavec, 2006). 
 
2.1.5 PMO frameworks 
According to Project Management Institute (2013a), there are a variety of PMO 
structures. Structures differentiate in terms of how they act, tasks they perform and the 
way they implement strategy. Also, Project Management Institute’s study emphasizes 
that there is no right form of PMO neither a formalized model nor is there a standard 
consensus over situational fit. However, it is important to note that structure does affect 
the power PMO exercises and influences PMO wields. In other words, structure matters.  
 
Different PMO frameworks affect the organization and project performance differently.  
According to Thorn (2003), there are three levels of PMOs: a project repository, a project 
coach and an enterprise project office. Forrester Consulting (2013) categorizes PMO 
frameworks to customer facing PMOs and business PMOs. However, Forrester’s 
framework categorization is based on project deliverables, and they can operate at any 
level of PMO.  
 
Secondly, PMO scope affects the structure it embraces. Project specific PMO has the 
highest level of business value realization and reports directly to chief executives (Project 
Management Institute, 2013a). Project specific PMOs are typical for instance to large and 
complex IT-projects. By elevating PMO to strategic decision-making level, organization 
creates an enterprise-level PMO: it coordinates project portfolio at the highest strategic 
level. In addition to identified PMO structures (Thorn, 2003; Forrester Consulting, 2013; 
Project Management Institute, 2013a, 2013b), PMOs can also be categorized based on 
knowledge-based archetypes. Knowledge-based architypes are interdependent with PMO 
roles and by adopting an architype, PMO also appropriates roles and responsibilities. For 
instance, objectives of the PMO and project maturity of the company affect the PMO 
framework the company should establish (Desouza and Evaristo, 2006). PMO 
frameworks are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4: PMO frameworks 
 
 
PMO framework defines purpose, form, mission and make-up of the PMO (Project 
Management Institute, 2013b). However, the challenge is to identify the right kind of 
PMO framework that matches both the organization and it’s needs as well as strategy the 
company wishes to implement through PMO.  
 
2.1.6 Project management system 
Project management office is a center of organizational knowledge for project 
management practices, techniques and standards (Letavec, 2006). Together practices, 
techniques, standards and methodologies form a project management system. PMO also 
facilitates process maturity and ensures that project performance is valued (Aubry and 
Hobbs, 2011).  
 
PMO is responsible for establishing smart, simple processes that translate into 
manageable routines to track progress (Baum and Wally, 2003). Managing strategic 
initiatives requires instituting well-defined processes that include routines to track and 
monitor progress. Smart and simple processes also enable identifying possible issues 
early. When scope and difficulty of projects increase, an evolutionary improvement from 
ad hoc immature processes to consistent, mature and disciplined processes can be 
witnessed. It stresses the ability to establish and follow consistent processes (Thorn, 
2003). In addition, PMO contributes to project success through improved monitoring and 
controlling, and thus provides an oversight over ongoing operations as well as evaluates 
their contribution long-term strategies (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004). Routine structures 
also retain valuable information and act as an organizational memory system (Baum and 
Wally, 2003).  
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PMO promotes proactive decision making through consistent project data whereas 
inconsistent data leads to reactive decisions. Consistent data is essential for objective, 
fact-based decisions that drive right strategic initiatives and investments. Additionally, 
PMO also collaborates in many networks and play a central role in the circulation of both 
intangible and tangible information (Aubry and Hobbs, 2011). Secondly, PMO’s central 
organizational home exposes it to intangible, organizational knowledge (Project 
Management Institute, 2013a).  
 
PMO is also key provider of project status information. As a central body of project 
information promoting transparency PMO also contributes to enhancing broad 
organizational commitment (Letavec, 2006; Forrester Consulting, 2013). PMO provides 
transparency by communicating actions and fostering collaboration between business 
functions hence increasing mutual trust and respect. PMO should also communicate 
current achievements against targets and provide an enterprise-wide perspective to the 
top management (Letavec, 2006; Keenan et al., 2013). According to Keenan et al. (2013), 
what is being tracked and communicated conveys to the organization what is critical to 
success. Crawford (2011) also reminds that one cannot manage what one cannot measure.  
 
PMO is responsible for setting meaningful milestones (Keenan et al., 2013). Milestones 
help PMO and consequently executives to determine whether the company is moving 
towards the desired goal (Crawford, 2011). Gaining and maintaining project control over 
project effort is about application of standards of performance, that is, metrics (Thorn, 
2003). Metrics and key performance indicators, KPIs, support milestones in progress 
tracking. It is essential to tie all metrics to strategic business objectives and thus ensure 
that objectives are also actionable. It is recommended to include in the project metrics the 
same strategic measures as overall business strategy is measured with, hence linking 
projects to strategy (Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012; Forrester Consulting, 2013). High 
performing PMOs often use standard financial controls such as budget variance and 
earned value to measure project performance. In terms of KPIs, simpler is often better 
(Forrester Consulting, 2013; Project Management Institute, 2013b). PMO should report 
progress weekly or monthly for example in respect to project delivery against schedule, 
customer feedback evaluations and cost reviews (Project Management Institute, 2013b). 
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In addition to project control, metrics and KPIs bring a new level of transparency to 
executive management. 
 
PMO is responsible for ensuring that the organization invests in project management 
tools. List of available project management tools is extensive (see e.g. Crawford, 2011; 
Keenan et al., 2013). However, among the most used tools are meaningful milestones and 
objectives, KPIs and metrics as discussed earlier. Roadmaps for initiatives and rigor test 
often belong to the PMO tool box, too. Rigor tests are meant to assess if the initiative 
supports overall objectives and strategy. PMOs are also likely to set up policies regarding 
project initiation, monitoring and closure. Project management tools support project 
management system and should be used adaptively depending on organization’s project 
management maturity.  
 
PMO should develop or adopt a project prioritization framework, and include it in the 
project management system. First and foremost, projects should contribute to strategy. 
Criterion should also ensure portfolio equilibrium in terms of risk, and short and long-
term benefits. Adopting rational goals conception consists of selecting right projects that 
affect directly bottom line (Aubry and Hobbs, 2011). Prioritization framework should 
also provide a decision framework to terminate unsuccessful initiatives not contributing 
to the strategy (Saunders, Mann and Smith, 2008). 
 
In addition to project selection, strategic portfolio management consists also of resource 
allocation guided by overall strategy (Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012). From resource 
management perspective, PMO makes sure right people are working on right projects 
regarding both project manager and project personnel. Allocation and efficient use of 
resources affect program and portfolio performance (Aubry and Hobbs, 2011). According 
to Project Management Institute, 36% of organizations list insufficient resources, either 
in numbers or skills, one of the biggest barriers to successful strategy implementation 
(Project Management Institute, 2013b). Selection of adequate resources assists in 
maintaining the continuity between the selection and execution phases, too. PMO is also 
responsible for ensuring that the organization invests in right human capital and embraces 
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the core competences of project managers (Forrester Consulting, 2013, Desouza and 
Evaristo, 2006; Keenan et al., 2013). Their role is equally important in fostering talent 
and capabilities within the organization, notably management and leadership skills. PMO 
should discipline and monitor the performance gap closely particularly in organizations 
whose main business is not project-driven. PMO is also responsible for input and buy-in 
of project personnel.  
 
2.1.7 PMO as a vehicle for strategy implementation 
The explicit goal of project management and projects in general is to create competitive 
weapons and differentiators for organizations (Keenan et al., 2013).  Project Management 
Institute (2013a) accentuates that “the alignment of the PMO to the goals of the 
organization is key to driving strategic implementation.” Traditionally projects are 
considered as tools for implementing organizational strategy and achieving overall 
business goals (Thorn, 2003; Morris and Jamieson, 2005; Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012). 
PMO manages multiple set of projects and ensure implementation of their strategic 
objectives (Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012). As projects are used as a mean to 
execute strategy, is project management no longer an operational discipline but a strategic 
discipline (Cooke-Davies, Crawford and Lechler, 2009). Managing corporate project 
portfolio has thus become a strategic management issue: it manages projects through a 
strategic lens, thus generating real value (Crawford, 2011). 
 
PMO is where project portfolio management and strategy most seamlessly meet. High 
performing PMOs also take part in the strategy formulation (Project Management 
Institute, 2013a). According to Keenan et al. (2013), “Aligning projects with strategic 
objectives has the greatest potential for adding value to the organization.” Consequently, 
PMO is the link between not only strategy and projects, but also with executive vision 
(Crawford, 2011; Keenan et al., 2013). Project selection is tied to overall strategy through 
project strategy (Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012). However, researches debate that 
companies often lack an organizational entity responsible for mapping and matching 
strategy and projects. Crawford (2011) notes that “the concept of having someone in the 
organization to look at the strategic objectives with respect to ongoing projects is still 
very new in many organizations.” PMO’s role as a strategy executor does not come 
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without expense. PMO must to be aware of the risk of becoming simply a box-checker 
losing strategic approach. On the other hand, PMO should not execute and implement 
projects itself, but focus on managing the portfolio or program.  
 
2.1.8 Critical success factors of PMOs 
Earlier studies have identified several critical success factors for high performing PMOs. 
Most important factor leading to success is executive support and buy-in (Saunders, Mann 
and Smith, 2008). Leadership support will also provide PMO with sufficient leverage. 
After securing executive buy-in, management must also define the role of the PMO and 
position PMO in the organization (Project Management Institute, 2013b). High 
performing PMOs have a seat at the executive table and they also take part in strategic 
planning. They provide feedback to the executives about operational metrics and thus 
help them in shaping the strategy.  
 
Moreover, Project Management Institute (2013a, 2013b) emphasizes the effect of skilled 
PMO personnel in project and program success. High-performing PMOs succeed in 
aligning business stakeholders and operational excellence (Forrester Consulting, 2013). 
PMO’s high performance also translates into project success and it is strongly related to 
project management processes.  Organization’s project strategy and project context also 
affect project success. However, unconditional use of beforehand selected project 
management model can result in project failure (Cooke, Davies, Crawford & Lecker 
2009; Forrester 2013). Thus, PMO is responsible for applying necessary and suitable 
controls and methods.  
 
Even though PMOs’ contribution to strategy execution, more efficient use of resources, 
and for instance project success are justified in existing academic literature, there are 
many reasons why and how PMOs fail despite the value they can bring to project 
management and especially to strategy execution. According to Forrester’s study, 
strategic PMOs face universal challenges regardless of the industry, company size or 
project management maturity (Forrester Consulting, 2013). Notwithstanding their value 
generation abilities, only 33% of PMOs realized their full value according to a survey 
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completed by Project Management Institute (2013b). In addition, the legitimacy of PMOs 
is challenged in 50% of the organizations having a PMO (Hobbs, Aubry and Thuillier, 
2008). Thorn (2003) argues that if overseeing projects and project personnel is not 
directly under its control, PMO’s value is challenged in organizations almost daily. These 
differences in perception and appreciations can lead to conflict and hinder PMO 
performance. Tensions between a PMO and other organizational units in turn can prevent 
the PMO from performing at the highest possible level. Organizational resistance to 
change, especially in organizational turnaround situations, is likely to hamper PMO’s 
performance (Forrester Consulting, 2013). Central position and reporting directly to high 
executives gives the PMO the required authority to make strategic decisions and take 
responsibility for their outcomes (Forrester Consulting, 2013). However, lack of direction 
from the top and lack of clarity of purpose can pose challenges to value creation (Project 
Management Institute, 2013b).  To summarize, PMO’s productivity is directly linked to 
its legitimacy. 
 
Project managers recognize the importance of a PMO in human resource management 
and in setting rational goals criteria but it is equally important for project managers to 
acknowledge the importance of PMO regarding internal processes (Aubry and Hobbs, 
2011). In contrast, financial managers do acknowledge PMO’s contribution to 
organizational processes as one of its most important contributions. Lack of cohesiveness 
both in project management practices and organizational processes can hinder value 
creation (Project Management Institute, 2013b). Failures due to inconsistent project 
management expertise performance accentuates the importance of establishing project 
management system and processes.  
 
Managerial failures such as lack of consistency in management, especially in terms of 
project estimation and budgeting, lack of formal tracking and lack of functional user 
involvement can also contribute to project failures (Desouza and Evaristo, 2006). Metrics 
must be viewed constructively: if they contrast with overall business goals, are they likely 
to lead to project failure (Thorn, 2003). In addition, inconsistent assessment of current 
capabilities damages project success, and consequently affects also PMO performance. 
With shifting priorities and faster delivery cycles, PMOs do struggle with providing 
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adequate support to organizations and promoting project success (Forrester Consulting, 
2013).  
 
Lack of common project-related language is also likely to cause tensions and lead to 
project failure (Forrester Consulting, 2013). PMOs should seek resolution to 
communication-related issues through an interface of systematically introducing, 
communicating and managing the elements of project management and control (Thorn, 
2003). Feeble knowledge management often results in project failure: Poor 
communication and knowledge transfer as well as inadequate reuse of information 
derived from past projects are some of the primary reasons researchers have identified for 
project failure (Desouza and Evaristo, 2006). Projects can be delivered on time and meet 
the expectations but still regarded as failures if they don’t contribute to the strategy 
(Crawford, 2011).  It is no longer sufficient to meet the project objectives, but projects 
need to contribute to meeting the business objectives, too (Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012).  
 
2.3 PMOs in PE investment portfolio companies 
One may ask why companies are able to pull the value creation levers in a buyout context 
but, not able to do so before. High agency costs, that is, misalignment of incentives 
between managers and owners, creates inefficiencies.  If there’s a mismatch between 
appropriate control posed by the PE house and entrepreneurial mindset of the buyout firm, 
the buyout firm is likely to underperform or go bankrupt (Wright, Hoskisson and 
Busenitz, 2001). PMO is responsible for executing strategic initiatives mutually agreed 
by managers and owners reducing agency costs and improving operational effectiveness 
(Berg and Gottschalg, 2004). Execution skills are strongly related to success and 
operational expertise (Kaplan and Norton, 2008), which explains why executives often 
turn to PMOs to execute strategically meaningful initiatives. PMO’s contribute in setting 
a corporate vision through projects while still paying attention to fundamentals: taking 
care of and monitoring e.g. basic controls, plans, and budgets. They adopt minimum 
viable approach by applying only necessary controls, and hence does not burden the 
organization. As Kaplan and Norton (2008)  summarize “operating value creation 
strategies might play a significant role in PE deals.” According to Project Management 
Institute (2103b), high performing PMO correlates directly with better strategy execution. 
They also drive superior business value.  
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The need for PMO in managing strategic initiatives stems from tactical initiatives no 
longer being sufficient. There is a need for a strategic approach (Keenan et al. 2013). 
Project management teams should consider the business aspect of the projects they 
manage to better support the business strategy and sustainability of their company 
(Patanacul and Shenhar, 2012). However, Patanacul and Shenhar (2012) also note that 
managing projects in a strategic way does not mean abandoning the operational 
perspectives.  Regarding PE portfolio companies, investors’ intervention and support can 
be very short term oriented which in turn can affect e.g. project selection. Consequently, 
long-term goals may get lost in concern for short term profits without project portfolio 
management (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004; Crawford, 2011). 
 
In rapidly changing business environment PMO can focus on the most strategic initiatives 
when line managers and business unit managers tend to have only little tolerance for 
perceived overhead.  Rapid change and turbulence have driven companies to form PMOs 
to implement strategic initiatives (Keenan et al., 2013). Thorn (2003) emphasizes the 
meaning of projects in strategy implementation: companies need to implement essential 
projects to ensure company growth and PMOs promote culture that embraces 
organizational excellence (Forrester Consulting, 2013). 
 
High performing PMO nurtures other capabilities impacting directly financial 
performance (Project Management Institute, 2013b). Not only does a PMO contribute to 
strategy execution and project success, but it also supports overall health and growth of 
the organization (Thorn, 2003). A PMO can contribute to encouraging culture of change 
and change management while managing the project portfolio (Forrester Consulting, 
2013; Keenan et al., 2013). PE companies must promote development of ambidextrous 
culture and simultaneously to seek growth opportunities and maintain sufficient level of 
administrative management (Järvenpää, 2014).  
 
2.4 Synthesis of the literature review 
The objective of the literature review was to answer the question 1) How do private equity 
investors seek to create value in their portfolio companies? Based on previous academic 
  33 
research, private equity investors’ value creation mechanisms can be divided into two 
main categories: professionalization and revitalization (Järvenpää, 2014). More 
traditional view on PE investor value creation and capture is based on operational 
improvements, valuation multiple and high leverage creating e.g. tax shields and 
increasing cash flow (see e.g. Keenan et al., 2013; Achleitner, Figge and Lutz, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, PE investors operate on three key value creation levels. First, they provide 
strategic advice and steer their portfolio companies with renewed strategic growth 
orientation and improved strategy implementation. Second, their offer operational advice 
e.g. by driving operational efficiency. Under PE ownership, several operational 
improvements, e.g. allocation of resources and choice of incentives, will likely to be 
carried out (Järvenpää, 2014).  And last, they improve monitoring and reporting and 
involvement in decision making (Järvenpää, 2014). Decreased agency costs and aligned 
interests contribute also to operational and management efficiency (Jensen, 1989). 
 
Perspective planning, whether privately owned or publicly listed company, begins with 
defining a strategy followed by actions and project to be completed within a portfolio or 
program (Keenan et al., 2013). Hence, the second part of the literature review aims to 
answer the question 2) How can a PMO contribute to value creation in context of a 
leveraged buyout company? PMO links mission, vision and a plan (Thorn, 2003) and thus 
acts as a bridge between executive vision and value creations mechanisms, such as 
operational improvements the PE investor wishes to pursue. In addition, PMO brings to 
the company a consistent way to evaluate, select, prioritize, budget for and plan the 
“right” projects that contribute to the strategy execution and have the greatest value to 
strategic interests (see e.g. Crawford, 2011; Keenan et al., 2013). Thus, PMO contributes 
to improved strategy execution. As a result, it should produce a clear, business-oriented 
value proposition (Thorn, 2003; Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012). In addition, PMO 
should be accountable for delivering demonstrative improvement (Forrester, 2013). 
 
Although both private equity investments and their value creation mechanisms and PMOs 
are extensively studied topics, use of PMOs as a value creation mechanism in leveraged 
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buyout investments is not well researched. This study thus aims to answer the question 
How and under what circumstances can private equity investors create value in their 
portfolio companies using PMO? 
 
3 METHODS 
 
3.1 Methodology 
The amount of academic literature on private equity value adding mechanisms and their 
impact on firm performance is extensive. Despite the substantial amount of academic 
literature on project and program management offices, the mechanisms behind the use of 
program management offices in the context of private equity portfolio companies is not 
fully understood. In view of the explanatory nature of the research question “How can 
private equity investors create value using PMOs” and how it combines two previously 
disconnected research fields, PE investment value creation and project management 
offices, case study is the most suitable research methodology for this study (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 1981). Also, considering the research problem, a multiple case study is more 
appropriate methodology. Multiple case study enables comparison between cases that 
will reveal systematic patterns across cases. Consequently, a multiple case study enables 
building testable theories whereas single case study builds only on limited theory and 
evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989; Garg and Eisenhardt, 2016). It should also be noted that the 
purpose of a case study method is not to test hypotheses or to provide statistically 
significant results but to generate theoretically meaningful insights on the studied 
phenomenon (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
 
Multiple case study method utilizes replication logic, that is, different cases are treated 
as distinct experiments. Thus, the objective is to improve analytical generalizability of 
the results (Yin, 1994). Case study method is highly iterative and tightly linked to data 
(see Figure 1). Data analysis frequently overlaps with data collection; hence case study 
can be described as a joint process of collecting, coding and analyzing data (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990). In addition, the process is inductive in nature.  
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3.2 Unit of analysis and scope  
The units of analysis in this study are companies that currently belong to a private equity 
company’s investment portfolio. Companies that have had or are currently running a 
project or program management office during the study are in the scope of the study. In 
addition, companies that have considered running a PMO, but decided to pursue 
development initiatives within another framework are examined. Studying these 
companies ensures that circumstances under which PMO is not a suitable value creation 
method are also thoroughly understood.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the industry in which the case company operates is 
indifferent. Even so, the case companies are selected so that they cover different 
industries in terms of, for example, size, maturity and growth pace to better understand 
the circumstances under which value can be created using a PMO.  Correspondingly the 
case companies are of different size and at different life stages of private equity 
investment to provide sufficient variety and coverage of different circumstances. 
 
In terms of the time frame of the study, case companies have run a PMO during 2011-
2017. Companies that had run a PMO or initiated a PMO before that time frame operated 
in an essentially different macroeconomic environment mainly due to the financial crisis 
of 2008. The purpose of this time frame is to eliminate PMOs that were initiated years 
before the financial crisis in a significantly different economic situation and right after 
the financial crisis to e.g. minimize its consequences and to survive it. Hence, analyzing 
these PMOs would not be relevant for this study.  
 
In addition, this study focuses on PMOs as a value creation mechanism for private equity 
investors. Firm-level, operational mechanisms that PE investors can use in order to 
improve the performance of their portfolio companies are discussed in the literature 
review. However, other value creation mechanisms such as financial engineering and 
increased leverage are briefly listed in the literature review and taken into consideration 
in the case selection phase but are not in the scope of this study. Last, the study focuses 
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on using PMO as a value creation method and thus, excludes from the analysis 
investment-level performance measures such as return on investment, internal rate of 
return and valuation multiple as majority of the companies haven’t been exited and 
consequently, value captured at exit is not yet calculable.  
 
3.3 Case selection 
Case study method suggests that cases are chosen by following theoretical rather than 
random sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cases are selected deliberately and so that they, for 
example, provide examples of polar types or fill theoretical categories suggested by 
existing academic literature (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). By using 
theoretical as opposed to random sampling, selected cases constrain extraneous variation, 
sharpen external validity and represent a theoretically useful population. Theoretical 
sampling supports the above-mentioned replication logic by allowing one to compare, for 
instance, diverse environmental and situational factors leading to different PMO 
frameworks. Short case descriptions are grouped in Appendix A.  
 
Relevant theoretical categories that were used in the sampling are built around existing 
academic research. Categories are private equity investment life stage, investment type 
(e.g. buy and build, strategic distinctiveness, and operative improvement) and PMO type. 
Naturally, an ideal situation would be that one would have a number of cases that all 
present different sampling configurations.  
 
3.4 Data collection 
In the case selection phase, the main data sources were discussions with investment case 
managers and investment case descriptions on private equity company website. These 
data sources were utilized to analyze each investment case and their suitability for the 
purpose of this study. The purpose of this initial screening was to obtain a comprehensive 
set of potential cases. In addition, screening was followed by a discussion with PE 
company’s Head of PMO to ensure that both case teams and case companies were willing 
to participate in the study. 
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Multiple case study typically combines data collection methods, such as interviews, 
questionnaires and observations. As explained by (Eisenhardt (1989), triangulation 
enabled by “multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of 
constructs and hypotheses”. Hence, this study utilizes two primary data sources supported 
by other, secondary data sources. Case study methods also allows adding new data 
collection methods should they arise mid-study as the purpose of a case study is to 
understand each individual case as much in depth as possible. Eisenhardt (1989) calls the 
method “controlled opportunism.” 
 
One main data source of this study are interviews with CEOs and COOs of case 
companies and investment managers. In total, I conducted 10 semi-structured interviews 
in six organizations and one interview lasted on average approximately 75 minutes. Table 
5 below summarizes conducted interviews in each case company.  
Table 5: Conducted interviews and written case material 
 
 
Semi-structured or themed interview is an interview method where the interviewer has 
pre-set question themes to ensure that the same information is obtained from respondents, 
yet the interviewer can occasionally ask some spontaneous ones (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 
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2001). As multiple case study treats every case as a distinctive experiment, semi-
structured interview allows the interviewer to pursue some questions at greater length and 
width than others thus extracting relevant, case-specific data. Semi-structured interviews 
allow the interviewer to keep the situation informal, yet contextual, systematic, and 
comprehensive. It also delimits the number of issues taken up by the interviewer but 
might leave some logical gaps in the data collected (Hirsjärvi and Hurme, 2001). 
Interview structure is outlined in Appendix B.  
 
Furthermore, interview data is supported and complemented by other, written data 
sources including program initiation reports, steering review reports, program 
management office reports and program roadmaps. These data sources were utilized to 
acquire preliminary information about circumstances of program initiation phase and 
more detailed information about the programs run in the case companies accounting for 
e.g. their structure, governance, contents, processes, and metrics. They also provided 
rigorous quantitative data on program details in terms of number of initiatives, work 
streams, program objectives, and KPIs. In total, these reports counted for 124 power point 
pages.  Table 5 summarizes the data sources in each case. In addition to interview data 
and case company material, secondary data sources were utilized to acquire relevant 
information on case companies. Company web pages and LinkedIn provided supporting 
information regarding case company industry and market information as well as 
educational background and prior work experience of head of PMOs, CEOs and COOs.   
 
3.5 Data analysis 
The objective of this thesis is to develop theoretically meaningful insights on the use of 
PMOs as a value creation method in leveraged buyout companies. According to Dubois 
and Gadde (2002), deductive approach focuses on generating propositions from existing 
theories and making them testable. Thus, deductive approach is best suited for the purpose 
of this study in contrast to inductive approach which focuses on systematically 
developing rigorous new theory from research data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, cited in 
Eisenhardt, 1989).  
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In order to analyze the data collected both from the interviews and drawn from the written 
case material, an abductive approach, systematic combining, was used as presented by 
Dubois and Gadde (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, 2014)Systematic combining was used both 
for within- and cross case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989). Systematic combining serves best 
when the process of evolving theoretical framework, empirical fieldwork and case 
analysis is simultaneous. Moreover, systematic combining focuses on building more 
“refinement of existing theories than on inventing new ones” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
As discussed earlier, current perspective on the use of PMOs as a value creation 
mechanism is lacking. To summarize, this thesis uses deductive approach and systematic 
combining in analyzing the empirical data. 
4 RESULTS 
 
In this chapter I will present the key results of this study. First, I will summarize the 
circumstances under which portfolio companies have decided to initiate a PMO and the 
argumentation behind the decision. Second, I will discuss the situational factors and the 
argumentation behind not instituting a PMO to create value. Furthermore, I will outline 
the agenda of each PMO and how they seek to contribute to value creation. In the second 
part of this chapter, I will explore experiences driven from each case and discuss the 
success of the PMO in each case company.  
 
The main finding of this chapter is that by recognizing the right circumstances PE 
investors can create value using applicable PMO frameworks in their portfolio 
companies. By considering the life stage, project management maturity of the portfolio 
company, and applicable value creation mechanisms, PE investors can identify adequate 
objectives and content for a value creation program, and successfully launch a PMO to 
ensure the execution of the program. Therefore, PE investors can contribute to the growth 
and the value creation activities in their portfolio companies through PMO.  
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4.1 Value creation windows of case companies 
In addition to traditional value creation through mechanisms such as. financial 
engineering and financial support (see e.g. Järvenpää 2014), PE investors take a more and 
more active role in the development of their portfolio companies and thus, aim to create 
superior value. Development areas are mostly identified prior to the acquisition or during 
the holding period, but development activities are completed during holding period. The 
value is partly captured during holding period and ultimately at exit. Based on the data, 
distinct value creation windows and their objectives are identified and summarized in 
Figure 4 relative to where they stand in their PE investment portfolio company lifecycle.  
 
Figure 4: Value creation programs in the case sample 
 
Cases A1 and A2 are strongly interlinked. The first one is a typical 100-day plan initiated 
right after the acquisition whereas the latter one has a more long-term objective and 
concentrates rather on qualitative than practical matters. Case B is an operational 
development program targeted to enable better strategy execution whereas case C is a 
turnaround with the objective of shifting the companies course and improve its poor 
financial performance. Cases D1 and D2 are also interlinked: case D1 prepared the 
company for divestment whereas case D2 had the objective of turning the company 
around and prime the company. The PE investor was strongly involved in cases A1, C, 
D1 and D2 whereas cases A2 and B were initiated more on case companies own 
endeavors. Thus, the three above-presented value creation windows are present in the 
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case sample. As the Figure 4 depicts, two case companies have had a PMO in two distinct 
value creation windows with a significantly different objective and content. Hence, it 
would be unreasonable to argue that a PE investment company can create value using a 
PMO only in one specific situation, such as after completing vendor due diligence 
analysis to prepare the portfolio company for exit.  
 
Yet, it seems that from a value creation perspective it is also important to identify the 
mission and the explicit objective for the PMO prior to establishing the PMO in addition 
to identifying the adequate circumstances. Based on the PMO initiation reports of three 
cases (Cases B, C, and D) a PMO can for instance be established to facilitate 
professionalization of the portfolio company promoting project culture and more 
established project management system with relatively vaguely defined objectives. In 
turn, it can also execute well-structured and well-defined program to prepare the portfolio 
company for exit. Objectives for each PMO are also summarized in Figure 4 above. Thus, 
initiating a PMO is not value creating itself but the value comes from the initiatives PMO 
drives to achieve the objectives. In conclusion, I argue that the value created by the private 
equity investors using PMOs depends highly on the circumstances and life stage of the 
portfolio company and the ability of PE investors to identify the value creation window 
where PMO is a suitable value creation mechanism as well as an appropriate PMO 
framework. 
 
In order to examine under which circumstances PE investors created value using PMOs, 
it is valuable to categorize the situations and objectives presented in Figure 4 in a 
meaningful way (Eisenhardt 1989). By analyzing the situations in which the portfolio 
company and the PE investor have decided to initiate a PMO, a categorization of 
circumstances into short-term tactical programs, long-term strategic programs and 
turnaround programs emerged as the most suitable framework. They differed not only in 
terms of the time span of the program, but also in terms of objectives and value creation 
mechanisms the program executes.  Thus, the situations presented in Figure 4 were 
further divided into three groups. Table 6 summarizes this categorization.  
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Table 6: Categorization of frameworks 
 
Depending on the situation in which the PMO was initiated, the life stage of the portfolio 
company, its project management maturity as well as industry and market dynamics, the 
program content varied significantly. The program or portfolio is targeted to create 
additional value and it must be tied to the key value drivers. Therefore, the program must 
be well planned to target the desired internal and external challenges.  
Three of the case companies engaged external consultants in the program initiation phase.  
Upon the recommendation of the PE investor, case company C employed external 
consultants to analyze current situation of the company and how they could improve their 
financial performance. The PE investor engaged consultants to analyze case company D’s 
readiness for exit. And case company B worked together with consultants to analyze their 
current operating model and used them to provide recommendations for further 
development areas. Interview data suggests that when the PE investor or the portfolio 
company engages external consultants, a change in course has already occurred, for 
example KPIs or targets are not met or the portfolio company struggles in making a shift 
of course. Thus, it would be an oversimplification to state that a PMO is established as a 
direct consequence of external consultants’ analysis. Instead PE investors and portfolio 
companies resorted to external consultants in analyzing the current situation and 
providing recommendations because they are objective and do not take a stand on either 
side. Especially in challenging turnaround situations, external consultants are commonly 
used to investigate the underlying factors that led to performance challenges. In addition, 
an objective third party neutralizes tensions and expectations between the PE investor and 
the portfolio company. Moreover, two case companies B and C also engaged external 
consultants in the program initiation phase to ensure rapid start and well-structured, 
applicable program. The interview data emphasizes that in a such situation it is crucial to 
ensure full ownership of the portfolio company over the program and its objectives. The 
circumstances and drivers behind each value creation program are analyzed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
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4.1.1 Short-term tactical programs 
 
4.1.1.1 100-day plan  
An acquisition is often followed by a 100-day plan. According to Boston Consulting 
Group (2017) the plan is critical to long-term value creation and has, amongst others, the 
objective of facilitating the joined life of a PE company and the portfolio company. The 
plan outlines the most urgent value creation steps that can be taken immediately after the 
acquisition. Namely, the 100-day plan consists of the first months under the new 
ownership, and hence the plan is very limited in time and in scope. In case A1 the private 
equity investor and portfolio company built a PMO to plan and execute the 100-day plan. 
Figure 5 outlines the plan in case A1, its structure, modules and governance. 
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Figure 5: Case A1 value creation program 
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The objective of the plan was to “put critical matters in order for the common journey to 
start, but it did not include any strategically significant projects” (COO of case company 
A). The 100-day plan did not focus on creating competitive edge in the long run. The 
program was planned and initiated quickly and consisted of sprint projects with a duration 
of maximum four months. As the COO of the respective case company summarizes “it 
was just a little facelift” and did not take a stand on the case company’s strategy nor on 
the long-term business plan. The “M&A machine” -work stream was directly linked to 
the buy and build -investment type. The work streams encompassing management 
system, reporting and governance and legal matters are typical focus areas for a 100-day 
plan. They can be described as administrative work streams and had the objective of 
lowering agency costs and improving reporting and monitoring. Service concept 
development had a more long-term objective whereas commitment concept stemmed 
directly from the organization structure the company embraces. 
 
4.1.1.2 Exit plan  
 
A vendor due diligence analysis is conducted by external consultants before the PE 
investor initiates the exit process. The objective is to facilitate the exit process both for 
the PE investment company and for the buyer. The analysis often results in several 
development areas and recommendations that the portfolio company should undertake 
before exiting the portfolio company in order to maximize profits from the transaction. 
As the PE investor is ready to exit the portfolio company, the program resulting from the 
analysis is often very limited in time and well-structured. Case D1 represented the above-
described circumstances and the program is outlined in Figure 6 below.  
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Figure 6: Case D1 value creation program 
 
In case D1, the strategic growth -work stream had the objective of ensuring strategically 
aligned growth projects and ensure proper pipeline management to ensure future projects. 
It was the most essential work stream in terms of additional value creation and value 
capture at exit. Whereas the three other work streams concentrate on streamlining cost 
structure - a typical activity performed by the PE investors prior to exit (investment case 
representative D). In addition, the program targeted poorly performing business units to 
prepare the company for divestment and to maximize returns.  
 
4.1.2 Operational development programs 
During due diligence analysis completed prior to the investment decision (EVCA, 2007) 
PE investors identify operational improvement areas and key value drivers to guide value 
creation during holding period. Further development areas can also be discovered during 
the 100-day plan and even after that whilst pursuing other development initiatives.  Case 
A2 represented a typical development program encompassing also work streams that 
rooted in the 100-day plan.   
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An operational development program is characterized by a longer time span and may 
have a less restricted scope than a 100-day plan. The program A2 consisted of projects 
with a mid- or long-term objectives and had a strategic impact in contrast to 100-day plan. 
The objective of such program is in general 
i) to complete unfinished work streams and projects from the 100-day plan and 
ensure their successful transfer to the line organization, and 
ii) to pursue operational development areas identified prior to the acquisition or 
during the 100-day plan, and 
iii) to identify and execute further work streams based on updated or altered 
strategic plan. 
 
Directly after the 100-day plan several projects were planned, launched and pursued 
simultaneously since the portfolio included many novel projects which the case company 
A had no prior experience of. According to the company COO, their success was 
relatively unsure, and the COO admits “we didn’t know if we were going to succeed in 
any of the projects”. After having initiated a number of projects, case company A 
constructed a portfolio of projects, and projects were grouped under three work streams.  
The final program structure is summarized in Figure 7. The customer management and 
sales -work stream and service concept -work stream stemmed directly from the 100-day 
plan and focused on increasing sales while ensuring service quality. These work streams 
were directly linked to strategy execution: the company had the objective of remaining 
industry leader also in five years’ time and ensuring their position as a high-quality 
service provider required investing in and developing the service process as well as 
customer management. The third works stream, resource planning, in turn focused on 
more efficient use of resources. In addition, the company had a number of projects that 
did not directly subordinate to strategy and were not in scope of the PMO. 
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Figure 7: Case A2 value creation program 
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Case company B was facing subtle industry disruption both in terms of customer 
segments and sales channels. Their operating model was challenged by digitalization and 
new players in the industry. Thus, the company decided to update their organization and 
management structure, and invest in building new capabilities in order to ensure 
execution of their strategy. The company assessed that their strategy was still relevant 
and remained unchanged but it required building new competences and capabilities as 
well as altering their operations to best respond to changing industry dynamics. Hence 
the company had initiated several projects, but lacked a portfolio-level view on their 
project efforts. Majority of projects were behind schedule, resourcing was insufficient 
and projects were not meeting their targets. Unclear and extensive project universe 
brought the CEO and the board to initiate a project management office and recruit a new 
resource to coordinate the portfolio. Due to significantly different internal and external 
circumstances in which the program at case company B was initiated, the program 
structure, work streams and governance appear very different from case A2 as Figure 8 
demonstrates. The digital development and customer communication -work streams 
focused strictly on developing new competences and capabilities in order to better 
acquire, serve and retain customers whereas operational excellence and data -work 
streams focused on improving operational efficiency and use of data. Better use of data 
had also the objective of promoting monitoring, reporting and more professionalized 
decision-making.  
 
Figure 8: Case B value creation program 
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Both operational development programs (cases A2 and B) represented situations where 
the program was developed as a result of prioritizing, resourcing and restructuring 
activities. The companies have scoped down from a very large, unstructured and complex 
project universe to a more structured and better-defined program with clear targets and 
objectives with the help of a program manager. According to the PMO of case company 
B and the COO of case company A, the process has been painful and challenging.  
 
4.1.3 Turnaround programs 
PE investors invest typically in companies operating in mature and stabilized but 
relatively cash-rich industries. However, industry and market dynamics are susceptible to 
change. These changes require portfolio companies to act and PE investors to support 
them in order to ensure additional value creation during holding period. Two cases 
represented programs initiated due to significant changes in their operating environment 
in contrast to case company B which was facing similar challenges, too, but to less critical 
extent. Case company C operated in an industry that was facing a “double dip” situation 
where margins were decreasing and raw material prices increasing – just after having 
survived the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008. The industry is characterized 
by low margins and short lead time. The process flow is crucial to success and raw 
material prices an essential factor affecting cost of goods sold. Consequently, it was both 
board and management team’s mutual decision to first engage external consultants to 
analyze the current situation and upon their recommendation initiate a program targeted 
to improve Gross Operating Profit and ultimately EBITDA. A consulting company was 
involved in the analysis and program initiation phase.  The consulting company 
constructed an extensive one year program for the case company consisting of six work 
streams and recommended a PMO to manage the program. The program is outlined in 
Figure 9 below.  The objective of the program was to make a significant change in the 
viability of the business. Thus, majority of the projects involved cost cutting and cost 
optimization activities. Also, new products and other ventures were explored in order to 
secure sales and viable product pipeline. 
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Figure 9: Case C value creation program 
 
The case company D was also facing crucial challenges in achieving the objectives of the 
program targeted to prepare the company for exit. The PE investor had already conducted 
an initial vendor due diligence analysis, initiated a program based on the analysis and 
pursued the program for nine months. After having run the program for only two months, 
the program steering board witnessed program targets un-met. The investment case 
manager remarked “the business went to a totally different direction than first presumed.” 
In addition, the case representative acknowledged that “there was not enough experience 
nor project management capabilities and CEO’s time went to fixing other things rather 
than managing the program.” Due to these challenges, the PE investor decided to alter 
the program initially targeted to prepare the company for exit and initiate a second 
program managed by the newly recruited CEO. The already initiated program and 
analysis conducted by external consultants were emphasized in recruiting the new CEO. 
The second program no longer had the objective of preparing the portfolio company for 
exit, but was “targeted to shake structures properly and put things in order” (investment 
case manager, case company D). The new CEO initiated a number of projects 
immediately and conducted his own analysis followed by the launch of the new 
turnaround program D2. In addition to the already ongoing projects, the CEO 
incorporated projects that were targeted to “put the company back on track” through 
operational improvements, improved efficiency and clarified strategy execution in the 
program. Compared to case D1, the turnaround program D2 was more comprehensive as 
Figure 10 below demonstrates. 
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Figure 10: Case D2 value creation program 
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4.1.4 Unstructured development project portfolios 
Not all portfolio companies establish a project management office to manage a portfolio 
of development initiatives. The interview data comprises also two interviews with 
portfolio company representatives that currently do not run a PMO. This chapter explores 
differences between portfolio companies that run a PMO and companies that don’t in 
order to better understand the circumstances and internal factors that don’t encourage in 
initiating PMO. These dimensions are summarized in Table 7 below and discussed further 
in this chapter. 
Table 7: Comparison of case company dimensions 
 
Based on case company data and interview data, the investment type does not alone 
justify the lack of PMO: case companies A, B, and E were “buy and build” investment 
cases and case companies A and B run a PMO as opposed to case company E. Case 
company A even included in their 100-day plan a work stream that was strictly targeted 
to facilitate and structure the acquisition process. Portfolio company E’s growth strategy 
was based on acquiring and integrating additional units, previously independent 
companies, to the platform company. Deputy CEO of case company E emphasizes 
multiple factors, such as brand perspective and IT systems, and their importance in the 
integration process, but admits that for instance renovation needs are assessed case by 
case due to their cost sensitivity. According to the Deputy CEO, their integration process 
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was not very structured compared to case company A.  Interview data suggests that 
depending on the pace, complexity and size of the acquisition, a structured and well-
defined acquisition and integration process is recommended notably when the level of 
collaboration between business units is high. As company representative from case 
company F summarized “onboarding new business units consists of integrating financial 
processes and systems, offering and organization, PR, communication and recruiting 
processes just to name a few.” In other words, acquisition and integration process is 
always risky and calls for a systematic framework. 
 
One factor that differentiated case companies with a PMO from the other interviewed 
companies was the size of the ‘headquarter’ incorporating common support functions.  
The headquarter of case company E consisted only of 10 to 15 people, and case company 
F’s only of five people compared to for example case company B with a group 
headquarter of approximately 50 people. What enabled case companies E and F to have 
a decentralized management system and a strong autonomy at each business unit were 
workshop managers at case company E and managing directors at case company F. 
However, business units of case company B are managed by general managers. Small 
headquarter enables portfolio companies to manage development initiatives tightly 
whereas data suggests that there is a need for group level controlling structure with regard 
to larger headquarters. 
 
In addition to the size of the corporate headquarter, portfolio companies constitute 
different organizational structures. Case company F was a network of individual agencies, 
whereas case company E was essentially a chain of workshops in contrast to case 
companies A and B which were also chain of individual business units but with relatively 
strong, centralized management. However, from strictly administrative perspective 
portfolio companies F and B were both holding companies. Even though a holding 
company, case company F focused heavily on stronger integration of existing business 
units rather than development initiatives or acquitting new business units. To emphasize 
the importance of strongly integrated operations, the COO of case company F spoke of a 
“family”. According to him, their critical success factor was to make sure all the 
managing directors of each unit were “fully on board and aware of the network strategy” 
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and “fully understand the width and depth of the network”.  All interviewees 
acknowledged that their companies were strongly integrated in terms of common 
operating model, IT-systems, KPIs as well as clients. 
 
With a smaller headquarter, the number of development initiatives was also significantly 
smaller. In case company E, the only group wide development initiative was IT-system 
integration, comprising of e.g. enterprise resource planning (ERP) system. The COO of 
portfolio company F mentioned only two company-wide ongoing development 
initiatives: common customer relationship management system and an internship 
program. In addition to the sheer size of the corporate headquarter, the task they perform 
affect the number of development initiatives coordinated by the headquarter. 
 
PMO increases also the level of professionalism in the portfolio company by 
implementing well-defined, routine structures to plan, monitor and execute projects. 
Especially in portfolio companies where the level of managerial skills is low, PMO can 
create additional value through professionalization. Case companies B, C and D 
embraced it by implementing a series of processes and routines to follow in order to 
increase the level of professionalism in their portfolio companies. Operating in heavy 
vehicle and mechanical industry, portfolio company E may face challenges in project and 
portfolio management should the number and complexity of projects increase. On the 
other hand, portfolio company F’s business was project-based and the staff had 
background in fields such as industrial engineering and computer science, thus having a 
higher level of managerial capabilities and project management competences.  
 
4.1.5 Conclusion of drivers to initiate a PMO 
To conclude with, PE investors and their portfolio companies have initiated a value 
creation program under three distinct circumstances.  First, the objective of short-term, 
more tactical programs was to prepare the portfolio company for and facilitate the next 
phase in the PE investment lifecycle. It may be for instance ongoing active ownership or 
exit. The program is well-defined in terms of time and scope. Second, the portfolio 
companies have established a more long-term, strategic value creation programs to ensure 
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strategy execution and achieve challenging operational and numerical objectives set by 
the PE investors. These operational development programs are often less structured and 
the program scope may even change during the program. Last, the PE investor may 
initiate a turnaround program to restore the company's performance and thus ensure 
additional value creation and capture. In general, the PE investor was most involved in 
the short-term programs related to acquisition or exit and in the turnaround programs due 
to their importance to value capture. In addition, external consultants were typically 
engaged in the analysis before the program initiation phase and in some cases also in the 
program launch. 
 
As a conclusion, there are four key elements in assessing the suitability and need for a 
program management office. First, it seems that the size of the corporate headquarter 
steers the number of enterprise-wide development projects and consequently, the need 
for comprehensive controlling and supporting structure. Case company A struggled with 
coordinating nine enterprise-wide projects without a designated PMO whereas case 
company D’s turnaround program consisted of 24 activities and was managed by the 
company CEO. Data suggests also that the size of the headquarter is proportional to the 
number of resources involved in development projects and variation of project personnel. 
Should the size of the headquarter grow, the number of projects and consequently project 
personnel is likely to increase resulting in need for enhanced structure and control. 
However, the existing literature accentuates that if the portfolio company was to 
undertake one, large, enterprise-wide project, it would be recommended to initiate a 
project management office dedicated to the specific project.   
 
4.2 PMOs’ contribution to value creation  
As discussed in the previous chapter, private equity investors used PMOs in specific 
situations to create additional value. Previous chapter outlined specific objectives of the 
value creation programs, their structure and the work streams of each program in more 
detail to outline the external and internal factors and objectives that call for a PMO. 
Moreover, PMOs in each case used a set of tools and frameworks, embrace certain roles 
and responsivities in order to contribute to, enable and support growth. This chapter 
discusses PMO mechanisms used in the cases to promote the value creation. 
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4.2.1 Case PMO’s objectives 
Based on the interview data and existing academic research on PMOs, by far the most 
essential task of a PMO is to ensure the execution of strategic projects (see e.g. Crawford, 
2011). Program management office was commonly described as the “right arm of the 
CEO” (Deputy CEO, case company E and CEO, case company C). Deputy CEO of case 
company E also accentuated that strategic projects should be on the agenda of the CEO 
hence emphasizing the importance of executive support and buy-in. Interview data and 
program initiation reports supported the claim. 
 
In terms of other key activities of the PMO in leveraged buyout context, interview data is 
ambiguous. However, all interviewees highlighted two key activities: ensuring the 
execution of strategically important projects as discusses in the previous paragraph and 
project prioritization. In terms of business objectives, all six PMOs in the four case 
companies focus on increasing sales and optimizing cost structure. Case company C’s 
program focused strictly on improving gross operating profit and EBITDA whereas 
turnaround program D2 and case company B’s development program involved also work 
streams consisting of restructuring the organization and renewing their operating model. 
These programs had a strategic importance and they were supported by the CEO. 
However, the operative development program A2 was somewhat focused on enabling 
strategy execution but lacked an enterprise-wide strategic meaning and buy-in. In terms 
of professionalization, case B was the only program with professionalization as an 
explicit objective of the program whereas professionalization was seen as a by-product 
of the program in terms of other operational development and turnaround programs (cases 
A2 and D2).  
 
4.2.2 Program structure 
Based on program report data, a typical number of work streams was 3-5 (see Figures 5-
10). Still the number of projects under each work varies significantly. The number 
depended on company size and project maturity, project size and complexity as well 
dedicated resources. Case company C ran simultaneously 16 projects grouped under four 
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work streams whereas case company A only two or three projects under three work 
streams. Table 8 outlines program structure and size as well as focus areas of each 
program.  
 
The size of the program was somewhat proportional to the strategic importance of the 
program. For instance, case companies C and D were forced to involve the entire 
company to the program in order to shift the course of the company whereas case 
companies A and B ran operative development programs alongside their daily operations. 
From operational perspective, the focus at case companies C and D was in the program 
as opposed to case companies A and B where it was on daily operations. 
 
Table 8: Program structure and objectives 
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4.2.3 PMOs and project managers 
Programs and project portfolios included in the case sample had significantly different 
objectives as discussed in the chapter 4.2.1 and as Figures 5-10 demonstrate. Based on 
interview data, case companies’ project maturity varies considerably and they had 
different needs regarding for example execution support due to lower project 
management maturity (case company D) whereas other call for prioritizing and 
structuring activities due to excessive and indeterminate project portfolio (case company 
B). Interview data and program initiation reports (cases B, C, D1 and D2) indicate that 
program managers and portfolio managers had various roles and responsibilities in the 
case companies. Based on Desouza and Evaristo’s (2006) and Project Management 
Institute’s (2013a) classification, their roles represented different PMO architypes. 
Program manager profiles are summarized in Table 10 below. 
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Table 9: PMO profiles in case companies 
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Interview data supports Keenan et al. (2013) in terms of PMO resourcing: the program 
or portfolio is often best managed by one person. Naming conventions varied between 
program managers, portfolio managers and program or portfolio management officers 
(PMO). The PMO was run by a portfolio company employee in all cases. In addition, the 
program manager was supported by investment case manager during the two short-term, 
tactical programs. The 100-day plan is on top of the PE investor’s agenda due to its 
importance to long-term value creation (Boston Consulting Group, 2017) hence a 
member of the corresponding investment case team is likely and highly recommended to 
take part in the program management. On the other hand, one objective of exit program 
D1 was to maximize PE investor’s profits and thus, it is only reasonable that the PE 
investor was closely involved in the program management. Two programs were managed 
by executive directors. Chief IT Officer (CIO) run the operational development program 
A2 because “many of the projects were very system related” (COO of case company A). 
However due to incompetent portfolio company personnel and very low project maturity, 
the PE investor looked for external PMO and project managers to manage the exit 
program D1 of case company D, but eventually trusted the CEO with the PMO task. 
Newly recruited CEO was trusted to manage the turnaround program D2 of case company 
D after the unsuccessful exit program D1. 
 
A specific program manager or portfolio manager was recruited in two cases: B and C. 
Due to the complexity and size of the program and lack of adequate resource, both case 
companies decided to recruit a PMO outside the organization to oversee project activities 
and ensure punctual execution of the projects. However, there are both positive and 
negative effects in recruiting a PMO outside of the organization. On one hand, the PMO 
may be considered PE investor’s agent in the portfolio company and consequently lack 
organizational trust and buy-in. On the other, a newly recruited PMO is objective and 
ignorant of possible tensions between the case company and the PE investor and 
consequently, focus only on project delivery. Based on interview data and interviewees 
experiences from other portfolio company PMOs (CEO of case company C and deputy 
CEO of case company E), the PMO should integrate to the company without losing 
objective and critical approach. Moreover, the CEO of case company C emphasizes that 
even though the PMO might be recruited only to run a program, he or she should 
demonstrate personal buy-in for example by learning to use essential tools and systems 
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and showing personal interest in the project activities. Notwithstanding, interview data 
suggests that the portfolio companies assessed the positive effects of an externally 
recruited PMO to surpass the negatives ones.  
 
4.2.3.1 PMO’s legitimacy 
In majority of cases the PMO reported directly to the CEO. Existing academic research 
recommends that the PMO should be a free agent outside of the line organization and 
report directly to the CEO and steering board (Keenan et al., 2013). Both externally 
recruited PMOs operated outside the traditional line organization and directly under the 
CEO. In terms of the 100-day plan A1, the current COO of case company A managed the 
portfolio with a direct reporting line to the CEO and to the board of directors. However, 
the operative development program A2 was managed by the CIO who reported to the 
COO who in turn reported to the CEO. Thus, the program lacked direct executive support 
and oversight. Case company D’s both programs were managed by the CEO – though the 
CEO was replaced after the first program D1 was discontinued. Again, project managers 
generally manage projects alongside their operational responsibilities. For instance, in 
case company A and their 100-day plan A1, each project had its own project manager 
who reported directly to the PMO and steering group whereas project managers at case 
company B and C reported to the PMO and their direct superior.  Project managers came 
from the line organization in most cases but some projects were managed by the PMO 
(case A2, C and D2). To summarize, project managers reported to the PMO, who then 
reported to the executive management team and to the steering group or directly to the 
board of directors whereas projects were managed by case company employees in parallel 
with their operational duties. 
 
Majority of the interviewees (representatives of case companies A, B, C and E) emphasize 
the fact that PMOs should have sufficient mandate to make necessary decisions fast. One 
interviewee (case company E) suggested that PMO’s mandate should be very similar to 
CEO’s mandate: “Only then, PMO can contribute to value creation by managing the 
program and portfolio of projects.” Deputy CEO of case company E and COO of case 
company A both suggest that portfolio manager should regularly attend executive 
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management team meetings even though not necessarily taking part in the executive 
management team.  
 
4.2.3.2 PMO’s organizational fit 
Three out of four case companies struggled in finding the suitable PMO framework and 
type to fit both the organization and the PMO objectives. The CEOs as the PMOs in case 
D had responsibility over the execution of the projects. However, the investment case 
manager reported that in terms of case D1 work streams directly under the CEO’s 
responsibility performed the most poorly even though they were strategically the most 
important ones. Investment case manager noted “all his/her time went to extinguishing 
fires rather than coordinating the development initiatives.” As a conclusion, he assessed 
that managing both the program and two separate country organizations was too 
demanding considering CEO’s experience and competences. Whereas the CEO of the 
case company C complimented the PMO for having strong analytical skills, and 
compelling and relevant business expertise, but lacked commitment to the company. 
According to the CEO, the program was managed routinely, without questioning actions 
or debating over approaches. As a result, the organization started to lose respect toward 
the PMO after having realized there was no personal interest nor buy-in. As the CEO put 
it: “others considered the PMO ‘elite’ with a background in top management consulting 
companies and that (s)he was now put among ordinary people.” The case program A1 
was managed by current Chief Operating Officer in close collaboration with an internal 
subject matter expert as streams 2 and 3 described in the Figure 5 required strong industry 
expertise in the respective areas. However, the CIO as the PMO in case A2 had only a 
documenting and communicating role when the organization and especially their 
extensive project universe would have required more controlling and coordinating PMO 
approach (COO of case company A). As the COO states “the PMO takes care that all the 
reports are completed and submitted in time. Basically, he only makes sure that the 
process works.” Consequently, the PMO had no responsibility over project deliverables. 
 
In terms of case company B’s operative development program and case company D’s 
turnaround program D2, the PMO took a more supporting role due to lack of structure 
and project management processes. On the other hand, in terms of roles and 
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responsibilities PMOs in both short-term, tactical programs adopted a traditional PMO 
framework of goal splitting (Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012) as discussed earlier. 
The investment case manager was also tightly involved in these organizational task force 
units.  
 
4.2.4 Focus on prioritization and resourcing 
PE investment portfolio companies must constantly balance between the challenging 
demands of the PE investors and their limited resources. High leverage forces portfolio 
companies to allocate scarce resources where they best contribute to value creation. Due 
to preordained resource limitations, all interviewees accentuate the importance of 
prioritization. 
 
Two case companies reported challenges in their review and prioritization process. COO 
of case company A admitted that their prioritization process does not work resulting in 
too many, simultaneously ongoing projects with insufficient resources and overlapping 
interests. Hence, the quality of the project outcomes deteriorates. At case company A, the 
PMO focused only on coordinating strategic projects, but operational projects lacked 
oversight. Consequently, the company lacked portfolio-level management, comprising 
both strategic and operational projects, and therefore, suffered from losing project focus, 
which in turn hindered value creation. The PMO of case company B reported that through 
the PMO was responsible for building a prioritization framework, the mindset of project 
managers and executives still had to be changed in order for the framework to work. 
 
Two case company representatives (case companies A and B) disclose that their 
companies had too many ongoing projects. The case company A has over 20 ongoing 
projects nine of which are strategic projects creating competitive advantage. COO of the 
respective case company stated that they have made decisions at executive level of not 
pursuing certain projects but they don’t have sufficient control over simultaneous project 
activities. Project one-pagers and project plans are commonly altered so that projects fit 
the portfolio and can be pursued. The COO states “The risk of doing too much at the same 
time has already realized” (case A2). As a result, their prioritization process did not work. 
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Project managers and project sponsors wanted to pursue their own projects, and were not 
ready to “kill their darlings” (COO, case company A). This phenomenon clearly 
demonstrates the need of enterprise-level PMO.  
 
Moreover, at case company B, the PMO was tasked with creating a prioritization 
framework to ensure the execution of strategically meaningful projects. In contrast, at 
cases C and D1 the program consisted of predefined projects and no advanced 
prioritization framework was needed. In case company A’s operative development 
program A2, the responsibility over prioritization effort was transferred to work stream 
leaders. In addition to prioritization framework, both case companies B and C had 
implemented a “gate theory”: project progress was monitored against preordained 
milestones and targets. If the targets were not met, the project would be suspect to re-
evaluation and possibly discontinued.  
 
The interview data and the program progress reports (cases B and C) suggest that in PE 
investment cases project management should focus on assessing whether the projects 
meet their targets and contribute to overall business objectives. Existing academic 
research (Desouza and Evaristo, 2006; Cooke-Davies, Crawford and Lechler, 2009) 
supports the case representative from case company A who stated that budget and 
resourcing are only secondary matters if business objectives are not met. He also noted 
that business case analysis is only relevant in the project planning phase when analyzing 
how the project would contribute to business objectives and targets. Business case thus 
becomes a guiding principle in project prioritization: in deciding whether to pursue a 
proposed initiative. The interview data indicates that without business case analysis, 
portfolio companies often lack understanding of the direct variables that affect the key 
value drivers, and hence pursue projects that do not contribute to the strategy or 
operational development. 
 
To conclude, on of PMO’s key objectives is to ensure use of a simple and easily adoptable 
project prioritization framework and to engage in continuous evaluation of project 
progress and deliverables. However, two companies were pursuing a disproportionate 
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number of operational projects, not leaving enough capacity to engage in strategic 
projects creating additional value. One company had started structuring their project 
universe by recruiting a PMO and establishing project prioritization framework, whereas 
the other didn’t require an enterprise level PMO despite the obvious negative effects due 
to the lacking one.  
 
4.2.4.1 Project classification 
Based on the case data, both the interview data and the written material provided by case 
companies (project initiation reports of case B, C, D2), projects classification followedM 
a simple pattern and is not extremely sophisticated, since it would defeat the purpose of 
helping the case companies to prioritize their projects and allocate resources based on the 
projects’ importance and urgency.  
 
Two case companies (case companies A and B) have categorized their projects into 
three distinct groups. These groups are 
a) Strategic projects that create competitive edge. They form larger programs that 
are followed at executive and owner level – in other words, they are on the agenda 
of the executive management team and board of directors. 
b) Operational projects that improve daily operations or are operational “must 
have” projects, but do not create competitive advantage. These projects are often 
monitored at business unit level.  
c) “C-class” projects that consists of “nice to have” projects and are only pursued 
should there be available resources.  
 
PMO should include also operational projects in the project portfolio and take them into 
consideration in portfolio management to ensure sufficient resourcing and balanced 
portfolio in terms project variables, such as project size and risk. In contrast, so-called 
‘C-class’ projects should seldom be carried out under PE investor ownership due to scarce 
resources (COO of case company A and CEO of case company B). However, COO of 
case company A notes that many projects persistently pushed forward by senior managers 
often are ‘C-class’ projects. For this reason, PMO’s objective view on prioritization and 
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categorization is essential for the portfolio company to pursue projects creating additional 
value and competitive advantage. Compared to case A2 and B’s categorization, case C 
and both of case company D’s programs consisted only strategic projects and thus, no 
categorization framework was required. To summarize, categorization framework does 
not only help the portfolio company in prioritizing projects, but also in balancing the 
portfolio. 
 
In addition, case company A has separated procurement and supplier related projects from 
strategic projects whereas case companies B and C have included procurement either as 
a work stream (see Figure 9) or included it in the operational excellency –work stream 
(see Figure 8) since more structured and systematic procurement will create competitive 
advantage through lower cost of goods sold 
 
4.2.4.2 Resourcing  
Available resources affect also prioritization efforts. COO of case company A accentuates 
“Resourcing should be on the agenda of the top management team.” According to him, 
“portfolio management in its entirety should be higher on executive management’s 
agenda.” According to the deputy CEO of case company E, PMO’s role is critical in 
evaluating resourcing. Without the PMO as a center of project related information and as 
an internal consulting organization, project managers typically are highly optimistic 
regarding required resources. Deputy CEO of case company E stated that “man hours” 
are most often underestimated, and consequently projects will not be delivered on time 
due to insufficient resourcing. Case company B’s PMO, too, reported that resources are 
limited and often the factor behind the decision of not going forward with a certain 
project. Therefore, the company must have an overview of available project resources 
compared to operational workload. PMO has been tasked with maintaining such an 
overview at case company B. 
 
4.2.5 Monitoring and reporting 
In addition to improved prioritization and resourcing, PMO also contributed to increased 
transparency and better reporting and monitoring. PE investors create value by 
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implementing more structured and sophisticated reporting processes, and focus on 
leading by numbers (Berg and Gottschalg, 2004; Järvenpää, 2014). The interview data 
indicates that PE investors should require portfolio level management, reporting and 
monitoring on project efforts. 
 
Structured, rigorous monitoring was built on key performance indicators, KPIs. To 
emphasize the importance of monitoring, case company A’s 100-day plan A1 included 
one work stream strictly dedicated to harmonizing KPIs and making them visible and 
easily accessible (see Figure 5). From PMO’s perspective project progress and success 
should be measured with easily accessible metrics. All interviewees as well as earlier 
research strongly recommend making KPIs visible to all taking part in the program. 
Program data suggests no clear number of KPIs to follow: case company C had five 
financial KPIs as well as five operational KPIs whereas case company B followed only 
six KPIs altogether. However, the program KPIs should be tightly linked to value creation 
drivers. Hence, majority of PMOs (case A2, B, C and D2) followed also operational KPIs 
in addition to project-related KPIs. 
 
Even though not currently running a PMO, deputy CEO of case company E mentioned 
that they implement same operational KPIs for every acquired workshop since day one. 
Strong focus on KPIs and structured reporting and monitoring clearly demonstrates PE 
investor’s influence on daily operations. In addition to well-defined KPIs, PMO also 
necessitates clear, demanding yet achievable targets and rigorous follow-up which is 
often lacking without PMO (Deputy CEO of case company E, CEO of case company B). 
Thus, a PMO may be considered a method to implement systematic KPIs, monitoring and 
reporting processes first, within the program and second, at organizational level. The 
CEO of case company C discussed that many structural mechanisms of the turnaround 
program, including rigorous monitoring, became routines adopted by the organization 
during the program. Thus, PMO promoted administrative management in the portfolio 
company trough project management system. 
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In addition to creating structure with clearly defined KPIs and ambitious program and 
project targets, communicating progress is equally important (see e.g. Boppel, 2013; 
Keenan et al., 2013). COO of case company A, deputy CEO of case company E and PMO 
of case company B recommended a monthly or quarterly portfolio review to support 
general board reporting to promote communication and transparency between the 
executive management team and the board. Moreover, a steering group is also highly 
recommended in the interview data. PMO and project managers should report progress 
to steering group in terms of schedule, budget and resources, who then addresses 
challenges and other noteworthy issues should they arise. Steering group’s task is also to 
support the PMO. Furthermore, program and project progress should be reviewed 
systematically in executive meetings. All interviewees stress that systematic reporting 
and program review on organization and board level correlates directly with success both 
on program and project level.  
 
PMO should also be the key communicator across the organization and make program 
documents, such as one-pagers, available to everyone in the organization (Deputy CEO, 
mmm). Three case companies B, C and D reported having established dedicated forums 
to follow program and work stream progress and promote communication across 
organizational units. Case company D founded three forums, two of which continue 
operating after the program closure: Margin management council met once a quarter, 
pricing “War room” once a month and new product “Launch room” once every two 
months. Case company B’s Digitalization forum met every month whereas they 
established a short, weekly meetings to follow the progress of small experimentations 
targeted to better customer communication, understanding and marketing. In addition, an 
extended executive management team met once a month to monitor and discuss building 
data-driven culture, a theme embedded and encompassing all work streams as a guiding 
principle (see Figure 8).  Case company D, too, had weekly calls to follow the progress 
of their turnaround program D2. Each work stream leader was responsible for gathering 
project progress data before the call and discuss the overall program progress. Compared 
to literature review, the role of communication and promoting transparency is less present 
in the interviews conducted with the case company representatives. One possible 
explanation is the fact that all interviewees either were running the PMO and thus 
regularly provided with project progress information or they belonged to the executive 
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management team and thus gained access to program related information through their 
position. Therefore, the interviewees weren’t best placed to assess the need and level of 
project related information at operational level. 
 
4.2.6 Professionalization and building new capabilities 
As discussed before, project management maturity levels vary significantly between case 
organizations. The interviewees observed (case companies B and D) that it was at a 
remarkably low level due to two distinct reasons. First, their main business is not project-
driven (case companies B and C) and hence no project management processes have 
emerged. Second, managers and executives are appointed project managers with strong 
subject-matter expertise but without necessary experience in project management (case 
companies A, B and D).  Their educational and professional backgrounds may be at fields 
non-related to project management or management in general. Hence, PE investors can 
create value by professionalizing project activities by building management and 
especially project management competences and capabilities in the organization.  
 
Company representatives (case companies A and B and investment case manager D) 
reported challenges in project planning phase in terms of drafting the project plan, road 
map, assessment of resources and as well as scheduling and budgeting. Deputy CEO of 
case company E suggested that, when project maturity is low, projects are first planned 
in terms of time, functionality or content, and resources. However, as explained in chapter 
4.3.4 interviewees acknowledged that required resources in FTE’s are often 
underestimated. On that account, the PMO’s supporting role in project initiation phase is 
crucial for project success. On the other hand, when building project management culture, 
methodology and competences, PMO’s coaching role is emphasized. As part of his or her 
supporting role, the PMO is also responsible for ensuring that project managers have 
necessary capabilities and competencies (Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012; Keenan et 
al., 2013). As discussed in Chapter 4.3.2 the PE investor had acknowledged the 
importance of the PMO in ensuring project success and project managers’ know-how, 
and hence considered external PMO and project managers for case D2. Due to lack of or 
insufficient project management competences, PMO is often the most crucial resource 
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ensuring the execution of strategically significant projects. To conclude, he or she is also 
an essential resource from PE investors’ point of view in long-term value creation.  
 
4.2.6.1 PMO tools used in sample cases 
Building project management competences stems from building a standard methodology 
of planning, executing and finishing projects. Hence, PMOs at case companies A, B and 
C have implemented a PMO tool box of project management methods in their portfolio 
companies. However, PMO tool box was in rigorous use only in case company C. The 
PMO at case company B had started to implement project management tools one at a time 
by introducing project one-pagers since the case company’s project management maturity 
was low. According to the company COO, case company A do have a project 
management tool box, but it was not in active use. However, the company representative 
admitted that they tried to follow some standard project management procedures but did 
not always “go by the book” because the organization was small and wished to stay agile 
while avoiding all unnecessary bureaucracy. Generally, the tool box consisted of one-
pagers and two-pagers, project plan, weekly and monthly reports as well as program-level 
metrics.  In addition, project progress was tracked with traffic lights (case companies B, 
C and D). PMO at case company also PMO maintained an extensive project listing with 
ongoing projects and project pipeline – a task recommended also by the deputy CEO of 
case company E.  
 
4.2.7 Conclusion of PMOs’ contribution to value creation 
To conclude, PMO contributes to value creation through different mechanisms. Due to 
private equity investment and high leverage, a number of mechanism are pronounced in 
the research data. First, the PMO is a visible face for the value creation program. PMO 
selection was accentuated in all interviews and special attention should be paid to finding 
the right organizational fit for the PMO. In addition, the PMO should adopt a PMO 
framework and role to best support the objectives of the value creation program. 
 
Second, the PMO promotes change management through the program and ensures the 
execution of strategically significant projects. High leverage emphasizes the importance 
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of prioritization and resourcing in terms of program management. The PMO is 
responsible for creating and maintaining a prioritization framework, and on the other hand 
ensuring adequate resourcing for projects creating additional value. However, for 
example COO of case company A names inefficient and inoperative portfolio review as 
their Achilles’s heel which in turn translates into inefficient use of resources. Project goals 
are not met and consequently value creation deteriorates.  
 
In order to drive change through a value creation program, it necessitates clear structure, 
monitoring and reporting, and above all, executive support. Hence, the number of work 
streams within the program should be limited. For example, the COO of case company A 
summarizes “the portfolio has lived and changed a lot which has been a big challenge 
for us” which causes dissent in the organization. To support the value creation, research 
data suggests that the PMO should report directly to CEO and program reviewed regularly 
in executive meetings. According to the interviewees executive support is one of the most 
crucial factors leading to program success. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter concludes the results of the empirical research and existing academic 
literature to form a synthesis based on the case studies supported by previous theories and 
existing academic research. Moreover, the reliability and validity of the results and the 
emerging framework will be discussed. Finally, I will make recommendations for further 
research. 
 
5.1 Discussion of the results 
The objective of this thesis was to examine how and under which circumstances Nordic 
private equity investors have used project and program management offices in their 
portfolio companies to create additional value. The theoretical part of the study was 
divided into two research questions: private equity investors’ value creation mechanisms 
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and PMOs’ contribution to value creation. The empirical part of this thesis followed this 
categorization. First, in Chapter 4.1, I examined the circumstances under which private 
equity investors have initiated a PMO to facilitate value creation activities in their 
portfolio companies. In addition, the structure of the programs and their objectives in each 
case were examined. Second, Chapter 4.2. discussed how the PMO contributed to growth 
promoting activities in the studied organizations. During this chapter I will discuss the 
implications of the results compared to previous theories in more detail. 
 
In order to discuss results in a structured manner, earlier presented existing academic 
research and empirical results of this study are further organized into a comprehensive 
framework presented in Figure 11. The framework will be discussed in more detail in the 
next paragraphs. First, the framework consists of propositions which are related to 
circumstances under which the PE investors have initiated a PMO to create value in their 
portfolio companies.  Second, it focuses on PMO characteristics, mechanisms and 
methods that PMOs use to facilitate growth in the portfolio companies. This group aims 
to answer the research question how PE investors can use PMOs to create additional 
value.  
 
Results of this study imply that private equity investors use PMO to create value in three 
distinct situations. Empirical data suggest that PE investors should initiate a PMO when 
pursuing certain value creation mechanisms. Based on categorization of value creation 
mechanisms in Figure 4 and the objectives of the value creation programs, I argue that a 
PMO is a suitable method to i) drive operational improvements and ii) ensure improved 
strategy execution. However, a number of significantly different projects can be grouped 
under the latter category as demonstrated in Figure 11. In addition, a PMO contributes 
indirectly to value creation through promoting more structured reporting and monitoring 
(Berg and Gottschalg, 2004), and lower agency costs (Jensen, 1989) as it is responsible 
for implementing a program consisting of projects mutually agreed by the executive 
management team and board of directors. In terms of more structured management 
practices, a PMO can strengthen and support the existing governance structure by 
implementing project management practices and processes (Thamhain, 2004). In  
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Figure 11: Proposed framework of PMO configurations in leveraged buyout investments 
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addition, management system is updated and governance model reshaped in majority of 
case programs.  
 
In terms of PMO governance, results suggest that a short, well-structured program is 
managed by an internal PMO and supported by the investment case manager. These 
programs are often strongly related to either acquisition or to exit: they prepare portfolio 
companies for value creation during holding period or aim to maximize value capture at 
exit. An organizational task force PMO may be initiated also under similar circumstances, 
such as a merger or a divestment of a business unit. The investment case manager is 
recommended to support the PMO during the program as an advisor and take part in the 
program steering group. Empirical data clearly indicates that a distinct value creation 
program should not be managed concurrently with other, more operational tasks. PMO’s 
objectivity respective to both management team and board’s requirements is crucial in 
terms of prioritization in order to implement strategically meaningful projects and 
contribute to improved strategy execution (Saunders, Mann and Smith, 2008; Boppel, 
2013). In terms of operational development programs and turnaround programs, data is 
unambiguous: an internal PMO outside the line organizations is strongly recommended 
(Aubry and Hobbs, 2011) though case program D2 was successfully managed by an 
internal PMO in parallel with operational responsibilities. Regarding the project or 
program management officer, empirical data implies that PE investors should pay close 
attention to the project management maturity of the portfolio company when instituting 
a PMO. Research data and previous academic research is unequivocal in terms program 
manager’s organizational home: The PMO should report directly to CEO, have a seat at 
the executive table and function outside of traditional line organization. A strategic PMO 
has leadership support also from a program sponsor or steering board (Crawford, 2011). 
Furthermore, academic research strongly advice that PE investors do not and should not 
run their portfolio companies but equip them with adequate and sufficient resources 
(Järvenpää, 2014) – such as the PMO. 
 
In addition to the empirical framework presented above, this study aims at providing PE 
investors and portfolio company executives deeper understanding of the use of PMOs as 
a value creation mechanism in their portfolio companies. Thus, PE investors should seek 
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to identify managerial competences and organizational requirements in building a PMO 
that best answers to organization’s needs and is the most likely to manage the value 
creation program successfully. Regardless of the PMO framework and value creation 
mechanisms, the program management officer has a significant impact on the program 
success. Majority of the interviewees focused on discussing the importance of the 
program manager for growth promoting activities and creating organizational buy-in, and 
outlined a number of PMO characteristics. According the three interviewees, PMO should 
be “a doer person and should get things done” (Deputy CEO, case company E). As PMO 
frameworks presented in the Chapter 2.2 and summarized in Table 4 underline, managing 
a PMO is first and foremost “people business”. To conclude with, PMOs have many 
different roles and hence not only subject-matter expertise and project management 
competences should be considered when recruiting a PMO. However, their importance is 
highlighted when project management maturity is low.  
 
Based on the theoretical framework and empirical data, a suitable configuration of value 
creation mechanisms (see e.g. Järvenpää, 2014; Jensen, 1989), PMO frameworks (Project 
Management Institute 2013b; Desouza and Evaristo, 2006) and portfolio company life 
stage (EVCA, 2007) emerges. A goal splitting PMO that operates on operational and 
tactical level embraces the roles of information manager and supporter (Desouza and 
Evaristo, 2006; Boppel et al., 2013). A goal splitting PMO typically executes 
administrative projects encompassing for example monitoring and reporting processes, 
and compensation and incentive system and is typical to short-term, tactical programs. 
As discussed in Chapter 4.1.1, administrative value creation methods are present 
especially in the 100-day plan (case A1). 
 
In turn, operational development and turnaround PMOs adopt the role of task force or 
overlay PMO (Boppel et al., 2013). A task force PMO embraces coordinating and 
controlling roles (Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012). These roles encompass traditional 
PMO responsibilities of building project management system, ensuring adequate 
resourcing and rigorous project reporting and monitoring processes. The importance of 
prioritization and strategy support is also accentuated. These PMOs add to the goal 
splitting PMO by operating on a strategic level and adopting also the roles of a program 
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coach and knowledge manager thus realizing also the supporting roles of the PMO 
(Desouza and Evaristo, 2006; Unger, Gemünden and Aubry, 2012). Especially in terms 
of organizational turnaround programs and restructuring activities, PMO’s supporting 
and coaching roles are emphasized. PMO should gain a recognition of business leadership 
and ownership, and all projects whether operational, tactical or strategic, should proceed 
through PMO. Also, empirical data supports existing academic research by clearly 
indicating that the more challenging and comprehensive the program is, the more PMO’s 
role as organizational face of change is emphasized (Letavec, 2006; Crawford, 2011). 
The program manager embodies the program objectives and thus, promotes change 
management.  
 
In addition to being the face of the program and contributing to change management, 
PMO’s most important role is to act a strategy implementer. The PMO ensures the 
execution of strategically most important projects: PMOs role is essential in delivering 
products and services to satisfy existing customers while always innovating to expand 
their existing markets. PMOs must seize new opportunities while controlling unplanned 
risk (Forrester Consulting, 2013). As PMO literature summarizes, strategy is executed 
through strategic initiatives (see e.g. Berg and Gottschalg, 2004; Keenan et al., 2013). As 
discussed earlier, all projects should flow through PMO because projects may not directly 
subordinate to strategy, but can still influence it (Cooke-Davies, Crawford and Lechler, 
2009). Prioritization is increasingly emphasized in leveraged buyout context due to high 
leverage. COO of case company A summarize “transparency and resourcing are key 
aspects of active, well-functioning project portfolio review process”. Thus, the PMO 
should focus on critical initiatives (Keenan et al., 2013) and act as a link between 
executive vision and strategy execution. 
 
5.2 Reliability and validity of the thesis   
In terms of assessing validity and reliability of qualitative research, existing academic 
theory is not explicit. Golafshani (2003) argues that in quantitative research the criteria 
for reliability is the replicability and repeatability of results, and validity is assessed by 
accuracy and applicability of results. These criteria are not fully applicable to qualitative 
research which aims at generating new theory in contrast to quantitative research which 
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attempts to test predefined hypotheses (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). However, a qualifying 
validity check for the research is still needed. In order to take into account different 
aspects of validity and reliability, criteria presented by Whittemore, Chase and Mandle 
(2001) is used and discussed in the following paragraph.  
 
The findings of the research are based on direct answers of the respondents and on the 
written material provided by the case companies. Credibility and authenticity of the 
research were further guaranteed by anonymity. Criticality and integrity of the research 
were ensured by continuous evaluations throughout the research process. Furthermore, 
all methods and claims were supported by existing academic literature or explicit 
findings. However, PMO literature concentrates on large publicly listed companies, and 
all frameworks, best practices and tools are not necessarily applicable in small and 
medium-sized companies or private equity portfolio companies due to e.g. limitations in 
resources and differences in business environment and business objectives. There are also 
geographical differences in project management maturity and practices as well as in PMO 
approach (Forrester Consulting, 2013). In terms of explicitness of the study, I am not fully 
unbiased since I worked for one of the case companies during the study. Even so, the 
company was fully in scope of the study and further biases mitigated by interviewing also 
the company CEO and providing extensive written material. On the other hand, since I 
had first-hand experience of managing a value creation program in a PE portfolio 
company, the interviewees were very helpful and willing to disclose challenges and e.g. 
negative effects of private equity ownership. As a conclusion, the validity and reliability 
of the study were ensured and possible biases mitigated through multiple measures.  
 
5.3 Directions for further research 
This thesis provides an overview of different circumstantial PMO framework 
configurations PE investors have used to create value. In turn, the proposed framework 
also indicates that a PMO is not necessarily a suitable value creation method for altering 
the strategic growth orientation of the portfolio company nor for promoting 
entrepreneurship. PMO mission and objectives discussed in Chapter 2.2. partly support 
this proposition.  However, as PMO is commonly used as a vehicle to implement strategy 
and can be used as transformational device, further research on portfolio companies that 
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have altered their strategic growth orientation and that have used a PMO to do so is 
recommended. In addition, the sample didn’t include any portfolio companies that 
promoted entrepreneurship but instead focused on institutionalizing activities. Thus, 
PMO’s applicability in promoting entrepreneurship should be tested.  
 
As mentioned in the Chapter 5.2 PMO approaches vary significantly between continents 
and countries. Nordic private investment industry is still relatively young compared to 
US PE sector for example. A comparison between the European and US PE industries 
and their use of PMOs as a value creation device in promoting growth would provide 
deeper understanding on applicable PMO frameworks in PE industry. An interesting 
question would be for example how US private equity investors have used PMO as a 
transformational device in their portfolio companies to alter their strategic growth 
orientation.  
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APPENDIX A: CASE COMPANY SUMMARY 
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APPENDIX B: THEME INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 
 
I. Employee and company background 
• Could you tell me a about yourself?  
• Could you tell me a about your current position in the company? 
• What is the background of the company as a buyout investment 
• In your opinion, where is the company now in the private investment lifecycle?  
 
II. PMO background 
• Are you running a program of a portfolio of projects?  
• How was that program or portfolio initiated?  
• How did you choose which projects to include in the program/portfolio?  
• How did you initiate the PMO? 
 
III. PMO dimensions 
• What is the organizational home of the PMO? Who does the PMO report to?  
• How do you measure the performance of the PMO? 
• How do you measure the performance of projects?  
• How do you measure the progress and success of the program?  
• How do you prioritize projects?  
• Who do is managing the projects and who do they report to?  
• What kind of roles and responsibilities does the PMO have?  
• How long have you been running the program? When are you planning to 
terminate the program and why? 
 
 
